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The issue begins with an examination of the development of drug courts,the most highly visible of the many “problem-solving courts” developedin recent years.  The first drug court was created little more than a
decade ago in 1989; today, there are more than 1,200.  No doubt there have
been many lessons learned along the way, and we try to find—and explore—
those lessons in the lead piece in this issue.
New York’s Center for Court Innovation convened a group of 19 judges,
court administrators, and others involved with drug courts to discuss what has
worked, what hasn’t worked, and where drug courts may go from here.  Aubrey
Fox and Greg Berman of the Center for Court
Innovation have provided an introduction to
the discussion, which is followed by an edited
transcript of the full-day discussion that took
place.  We think you’ll find it of interest.
The issue includes three other articles.
United States Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow
explains how to make sure that a settlement
conference results in a settled case, not addi-
tional disputes over what was agreed upon.  He
includes a helpful checklist a judge can use to
make sure that everything that should be covered actually has been discussed
and agreed upon.
The last two articles were runner-up entries in the American Judges
Association’s law student writing competition over the past two years.  Victoria
Cecil reviews the judicial selection process in Florida, and then proposes sev-
eral changes that might make merit selection more useful there.   Benjamin
Berger discusses the use of metaphor in judicial opinions, including review of
some specific cases from Canada in which metaphor has been effectively used
as a tool of persuasion.
We close with two reminders about Court Review.  First, we welcome letters
to the editor, book reviews, essays, and articles from our readers.  You can con-
tact me at sleben@ix.netcom.com to discuss any potential contributions.
Second, we remind you that all Court Review issues from 1998 to the present
are available on the web at http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/courtrv/review.html.  In addi-
tion, our articles from 1998 to the present are available in full text on LEXIS in
their combined law reviews database. —SL
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unsolicited,
original articles, essays, and book reviews.  Court Review
seeks to provide practical, useful information to the
working judges of the United States, Canada, and Mexico.
In each issue, we hope to provide information that will be
of use to judges in their everyday work, whether in high-
lighting new procedures or methods of trial, court, or
case management, providing substantive information
regarding an area of law likely to encountered by many
judges, or by providing background information (such as
psychology or other social science research) that can be
used by judges in their work.  Guidelines for the submis-
sion of manuscripts for Court Review are set forth on page
39 of this issue.  Court Review reserves the right to edit,
condense, or reject material submitted for publication.
Court Review is in full text on LEXIS and is indexed in the
Current Law Index, the Legal Resource Index, and
LegalTrac.
Letters to the Editor, intended for publication, are wel-
come.  Please send such letters to Court Review’s editor:
Judge Steve Leben, 100 North Kansas Avenue, Olathe,
Kansas 66061, e-mail address:  sleben@ix.netcom.com.
Comments and suggestions for the publication, not
intended for publication, also are welcome.
Advertising: Court Review accepts advertising for prod-
ucts and services of interest to judges. For information,
contact Deloris Gager at (757) 259-1864.
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of the Yavapai County Courthouse in Prescott, Arizona.
In front of the courthouse is the All Veterans Memorial, a
tribute dedicated in 1989 to veterans of World War I,
World War II, Korea, and Vietnam.  
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Since assuming the presidency in Maui last September, I
have been invited to attend numerous meetings of other orga-
nizations.  The AJA reciprocates by inviting the president of
these organizations to attend our meetings.  This interaction
between the AJA and these organizations provides for a closer
working relationship between the respective memberships.
Listed below are some of the meetings I have attended and a
brief description of what occurred at these conferences.
• Criminal Justice Summit on Impaired Driving sponsored
by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in
cooperation with the National Criminal Justice
Association—November 21-22, 2002, Washington,
DC.  The National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) is an agency within the
U.S. Department of Transportation. Approximately
100 participants, all of whom deal with issues involv-
ing criminal justice and impaired driving, attended
the summit. Representatives from law enforcement,
the judiciary, court administrators, corrections, crim-
inal justice, prosecutors, public defenders, and traffic
safety attended. The focus was to identify problems within the
criminal justice system in dealing with impaired drivers, with a
special emphasis on repeat offenders. The attendees were each
assigned to breakout groups, which discussed issues pertaining
to enforcement, prosecution, adjudication and disposition.  At
the conclusion, the participants made recommendations to Dr.
Jeffrey Runge, MD, the NHTSA administrator. 
• Conference of State Court Administrators, Midyear
Meeting—December 5-7, 2002, Captiva Island, Florida.  The
three-day conference was presided over by their president,
Patricia Tobias, who serves as the Administrative Director of
the Courts for the State of Idaho. One of the main topics dis-
cussed at the meeting was the issue of managing the court
funding crisis. This subject was discussed at all of the confer-
ences I have attended.  Other topics of the educational program
included a report from the National Center for State Courts,
developing performance measures for court operations, a secu-
rity summit update, and problem-solving courts. 
• American Judges Association Executive Committee
Meeting—January 16-19, 2003, Santa Barbara, California. The
date of the meeting was selected to provide a meeting of the
AJA’s officers midway between the Annual Educational
Conference in Maui and the Midyear Meeting in Billings,
Montana. The committee reviewed issues pertaining to the
budget, the Annual and Midyear Conferences, site selection
protocols, membership, the National Center for State Courts,
and the AJA House of Delegates. This meeting enables the
Officers to review those issues vital to the governance of the
association. 
• Conference of Chief Justices, Midyear Meeting—January
26-30, 2003, Williamsburg, Virginia.  The Conference of Chief
Justices was presided over by its president, Judith S. Kaye,
Chief Judge of the State of New York. Much of the work of the
conference, as is the case of many organizations, is
conducted through its committees. I attended sev-
eral of the committee meetings, including the State-
Federal Relations Committee and Public Trust and
Confidence in the Judiciary. Other topics and edu-
cational sessions included NAFTA, international
trade agreements, and a roundtable discussion
regarding confronting challenges. 
• National Association for Court Management
Midyear Meeting—March 2-4, 2003, Tucson, Arizona.  The
conference was convened by NACM’s president, Joi Sorensen,
who serves as the Assistant to the Executive Officer of the Los
Angeles County Superior Court. Topics of the educational ses-
sions were unequal treatment in the justice system, court inter-
pretations, serving the self-represented, developing cultural
competency, and overcoming poverty barriers to equal treat-
ment within the courts. Workshops were also conducted
involving judicial branch education as a best practice, problem-
solving courts, and defining racial and gender bias, with a dis-
cussion of resolutions to those problems as well as developing
cultural competency. 
• National College of Probate Judges Spring Conference—
May 7-10, 2003, Galveston, Texas. Judge Lawrence A. Belskis of
Columbus, Ohio, president of the college, presided over the
meeting. The topics of the educational sessions included mod-
eling a successful volunteer guardianship program, Texas pro-
bate law and procedure, community property systems, what
psychiatrists wish probate judges knew, and probate reforms. 
In conclusion, we share many of the same problems and
concerns with these other organizations. We benefit by mutu-
ally exchanging ideas on how best to resolve these issues. 
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President’s Column
Francis X. Halligan, Jr.
Perhaps no criminal justice innova-tion has spread as rapidly in recentyears as drug courts, which offer
judicially monitored treatment as an
alternative to incarceration for non-vio-
lent addicts. The first drug court was
launched in Dade County, Florida, in
1989.  Today, there are more than 1,200
drug courts either in operation or in plan-
ning across the country.  More than
226,000 defendants have participated in
these programs.  
Drug courts are the most prominent
example of a wave of “problem-solving”
innovation that has sought to change the
way courts operate in this country.
Alongside drug courts, domestic violence
courts, community courts, family treat-
ment courts, mental health courts, and
other specialized courts are using the
authority of the judicial branch in new
ways—in an effort to improve outcomes
for victims, communities, and defen-
dants.  These problem-solving courts
employ new tools and new methods—
such as requiring defendants to appear
regularly before judges to report on their
compliance with court orders, or adding
social scientists, drug treatment coun-
selors, and other service providers to the
courtroom team.
The first generation of problem-solv-
ing courts has achieved some provocative
results—none more so than drug courts.
Independent research credits drug courts
with reducing rates of drug use and re-
arrest among participants.  Also, treat-
ment retention rates—a key indicator of
long-term sobriety—are twice as high for
participants in drug courts as opposed to
individuals who seek out treatment vol-
untarily.  
To date, the drug court movement has
largely been a grassroots phenomenon,
driven by a highly motivated cadre of
judges, prosecutors, and court leaders.
Based on the demonstrated success of
drug courts—and the enthusiastic public
attention these courts have generated—a
number of states have begun to take the
next step, seeking not just to replicate
pilot drug courts, but rather to test sys-
tem-wide the viability of new approaches
to the problem of addiction.  Their focus
is on building systems at a state level,
either through special judicial branch-led
efforts (as in New York), legislation
(Indiana), or collaborative efforts that
bring together the heads of statewide
agencies like corrections, courts, and
social services (Utah).  
Clearly, drug courts are at the brink of
moving into a new stage of development.
Acknowledging this reality, in March
2002 the United States Department of
Justice, working with the Center for
Court Innovation, brought together a
select group of judges, practitioners, and
thinkers from around the country to dis-
cuss the future of drug courts.  The goal
of the roundtable was two-fold: first, to
unearth some of the strategic, conceptual,
and practical challenges that practitioners
face in attempting to bring drug courts
into the mainstream of court operations,
and second, to provide a road map to
drug court advocates in addressing those
challenges.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, the topic
proved to be a complicated one.  During
a day-long conversation, court adminis-
trators, judges, legal scholars, and experts
in other fields of social policy innovation
grappled with a series of difficult ques-
tions.  How do you “go to scale” with an
idea like drug courts?  Is the goal to pro-
mote continued replication of the drug
court model?  Or is the goal to advance
drug court principles and strategies, mak-
ing sure they take root in every court-
room?  Most important, how do you
institutionalize innovation?  Will the
drug court approach lose its effectiveness
if it becomes business as usual?
Several key themes emerged from the
discussion.   Many, though not all, partic-
ipants agreed that going to scale meant
more than “hanging more signs on the
door” (a phrase coined by University of
Wisconsin law professor Michael Smith)
or merely increasing the number of drug
courts in existence.  Instead, participants
seemed eager to distill the “active ingre-
dients” or “essence” of the drug court
model—and to encourage the spread of
drug court principles as opposed to
expanding the number of drug courts.
Adele Harrell, a researcher at the Urban
Institute who has written extensively
about drug courts, put it best when she
suggested that success for advocates
might lie in drug courts fading “out of
existence as their tenets become embed-
ded in practice.”  
The desire to spread elements of the
drug court approach—and not replicate
drug courts per se—has some important
implications.  First and foremost, it
means that advocates must identify
which elements of the model that they
wish to see incorporated into the broader
court system.  This is a more difficult task
than it might at first appear.  Participants
at the roundtable articulated a number of
core drug court elements.  For Utah state
court administrator Gary Becker, the
essence of drug courts is the creation of
new partnerships between courts and
state treatment agencies.  For law profes-
sor Smith, it is “the idea that sentencing
is a responsibility of the court over a long
term.”  San Diego Judge James Milliken
and Indianapolis prosecutor Scott
Newman cited concrete goals: providing
judges with more comprehensive assess-
ments and more sophisticated manage-
ment information tools to guide sentenc-
ing decisions and help track offender
compliance with court orders.  And for
New York Deputy Chief Adminstrative
Judge Joseph Traficanti, who’s leading an
ambitious statewide effort to create drug
courts in each of New York’s 62 counties,
the goal is to make it possible “for any
defendant, in any jurisdiction, to go into
treatment.”  The fact that participants in
the roundtable (most of them drug court
proponents) were unable to reach con-
sensus on the core elements of the drug
court approach suggests that more work
has to be done before advocates attempt
to mainstream them.
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A Conversation About the Future of Drug Courts
Aubrey Fox and Greg Berman
( D I S C U S S I O N
In addition to tackling conceptual
problems, participants also addressed
strategy questions.  Participants returned
again and again to the challenge of insti-
tutionalizing the drug court model with-
out dampening the spirit of innovation
that led to their creation in the first place.
“[P]eople don’t respond well to being
told, ‘You have to do this,’” said Lisbeth
Schorr, an expert on social policy innova-
tion based at Harvard University.  She
added: “You can’t mandate belief in a pro-
gram.” Indianapolis prosecutor Scott
Newman agreed, arguing that key leaders
must have “[t]ransformative personal
experiences” if they are to buy into the
drug court idea.
Roundtable participants repeatedly
articulated the tension between the need
to ensure quality control as an idea goes
to scale and the imperative to preserve
local flexibility.  One way this was
expressed was the effort to distinguish
“institutionalization” from “bureaucrati-
zation.”  “Bureaucracy creates a coercive
style of leadership that forces other people
to act in a certain way,” Scott Newman
said, while “institutionalization is a moti-
vational style of leadership which gets
people inspired.” Many participants
argued that the best way to promote insti-
tutionalization without bureaucratization
was to create an intermediary entity that
would provide the technical assistance
and support necessary to ensure the qual-
ity of implementation at individual sites.
This would help drug courts “move from
a system based on charisma to one based
on standards and principles,” without
sacrificing local control, according to
Columbia University law professor
Michael Dorf.  
Participants also highlighted the need
for drug courts to create new partnerships
or strengthen existing ones as they
mature.  One example cited was the need
to work with state drug and alcohol agen-
cies, which not only manage large sums of
money (from federal health and human
service grants) but also have responsibil-
ity for guaranteeing the quality of treat-
ment services.  Going to scale will be
“next to impossible” without involving
the commissioners of state alcohol and
drug agencies, said Valerie Raine of the
Center for Court Innovation.  
A second area for potential collabora-
tion are state legislatures, which in many
places are eager to create a statutory
framework (and provide funding) for
drug courts.  Partnerships with state legis-
latures can either help or hinder drug
courts, as the examples of Utah and
Indiana suggest.  While Utah provided a
statutory framework that allowed federal
treatment resources to be redirected to
drug courts—clearly a positive develop-
ment—in Indiana, pending legislation
seeks to codify how drug courts are
defined, a development that many feared
would severely limit local flexibility.  This
suggests that drug court advocates will
have to proceed cautiously in working
with legislatures.
In addition to airing out conceptual
and strategic challenges, participants
shared their reservations about institu-
tionalization—and in particular its poten-
tial unintended consequences.  “Today’s
innovation is tomorrow’s conventional
wisdom,” warned Michael Smith.  “I think
we need to find a way to go to scale that’s
open to constant change, revision and dis-
covery.  Otherwise, you just make it more
difficult for the next innovator.”  In that
vein, Adele Harrell cautioned against
“overselling the promise” of drug courts,
a shortcoming of past criminal justice
innovations that have come and gone. 
Despite these reservations, participants
were cautiously optimistic about the
prospects for institutionalization, point-
ing out that drug courts have already
made significant strides forward.  Perhaps
the most heartening news of the day came
from Lisbeth Schorr.  Schorr, who has
spent the greater part of her professional
life thinking about government innova-
tion, remarked that in discussing drug
court institutionalization, participants
had already reached an unusual level of
sophistication.  “[T]his is a far better,
more rigorous discussion than I am used
to hearing,” she said. 
What follows is an edited transcript of
the discussion, which took place over six
hours in a conference room in
Washington, D.C.
SETTING THE STAGE
Francis Hartmann: Where are drug
courts in the “going to scale” process?
Greg Berman: I want to read two quotes
that I think speak directly to that ques-
tion.  The first is from John Goldkamp, a
researcher at Temple University, speaking
about drug courts: “What we have now is
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DISCUSSION PARTICIPANTS
not a bunch of little hobbies that judges
have in isolated jurisdictions, but rather a
paradigm shift that larger court systems
are trying to come to grips with.  The
question isn’t, ‘Are the courts supposed to
be doing this?’ It’s, ‘What are you going to
do about it? How does it fit in?’ It’s no
longer a question of whether this should
be invented.” The second is from Michael
Smith, who’s here with us today.  He says,
“It seems to me there are two different
ways to go to scale.  One is to use prob-
lem-solving courts as laboratories to
improve the way they do business.  The
other is to build a new system devoted to
proliferating problem-solving courts.
That choice may turn out to be critical.”
These two statements underline the
theme for today’s conversation—an
acknowledgment that drug courts are
attempting to move from the margins of
the court system to the mainstream.  I
think the challenge is: how do you go to
scale in a way that is thoughtful and
deliberate?
Marilyn McCoy Roberts: When the
Department of Justice got into the busi-
ness of supporting drug courts in 1994,
there were about 30 or 40 drug courts
around the country.  Today we’re nearly
to the 800 mark and have quite a few
more—400 or so—in the planning stages.
What’s remarkable is that drug courts,
which initially didn’t attract much inter-
est from court administrators, have now
been embraced by the leadership of court
systems around the country. 
James Milliken: One problem that going
to scale will hopefully address is the
exclusion of populations that need our
services the most.  For example, federal
and state grants for juveniles exclude kids
who have been violent or who have gang
associations.  Now that we know the
medicine works, we need to expand the
system so that we can provide the medi-
cine to everybody who needs it.
Joseph Traficanti, Jr.: I think institution-
alization does mean, at least in part, the
creation of more drug courts.  I see it as a
fundamental issue of fairness: two people
arrested in different places for the same
crime should have the same opportunity
for treatment.
Michael Smith: For me, the question is:
what are we taking to scale?  The answer
can’t simply be to put more signs on the
door.  We have to know what the active
ingredient of innovation is.  Otherwise
we won’t be able to spread the idea.  
ANALOGIES
Hartmann: Drug courts are not the first
criminal justice innovation to attempt to
go to scale.  What have we learned from
other efforts in the field? 
Smith: Let me offer two examples.  The
first is pretrial diversion programs devel-
oped in the 1960s.  Public and profes-
sional opinion supported this idea, and it
quickly became the norm.  But nobody
had really done the research to under-
stand whether the program had the
desired effects.  Ten years later, when we
finally did the research, we found that the
diversions made no difference in out-
comes.  The second example is point
scales for the bail system.  In the 1980s, I
was visiting another state and came under
attack for a point scale they’d instituted
that wasn’t working.  I was told they’d
come up with the scale based on an arti-
cle I’d written about the Manhattan bail
project in 1960.  I said, “It’s 1980.  This is
a different state.  And we abandoned that
scale in 1970 because we found it had no
empirical basis.  What are you doing?” 
John Stuart: As a defender, I can tell you
that my clients were being denied bail
based on that point scale all through the
1980s in Minnesota.  It’s unfortunate that
we didn’t have this conversation 20 years
earlier!
Smith: The lesson I’m trying to highlight
here is the danger of replicating a specific
model to another context.  If you want to
go to scale, you’ve got to know why, and
you’ve got to be very careful to avoid
harm creation.
Hartmann: Mike Scott, what can you tell
us about your experience with problem-
oriented policing?
Michael Scott: We’ve had some success
in getting police officers to do beat-level
problem-solving, using street savvy, com-
mon sense, and some rudimentary statis-
tical analysis to target local concerns.
We’ve had less success with higher-level
problem-solving, applying more rigorous
research methods to study a class of prob-
lems experienced across a whole jurisdic-
tion.  A police agency’s enthusiasm for
problem-solving tends to wax and wane
with the arrival and departure of individ-
ual champions within the department—
when the champions leave, the innova-
tion disappears as well.  Many people still
cling to fairly simple notions of what
police departments can do, with no sense
of what a broad range of responses could
really be possible.  Problem-oriented
policing remains optional; it has not been
institutionalized.  One reason this is so is
that there is no external constituency say-
ing, “Give us more of that problem-solv-
ing stuff.” 
Hartmann: Is there a tension between try-
ing to turn each police officer into a mini-
problem-solving unit unto himself versus
trying to arm departments with better
analytical and research tools to problem-
solve on a higher level?
Scott: So far, the funding has been geared
toward line officers who want to go forth,
do good, and interact with the commu-
nity.  Unfortunately, that’s a heck of a lot
more politically appealing than the idea
of hiring a bunch of research analysts
who work back at headquarters to study
community problems.  And I think it’s
fair to say that line-level cops have held
up their end of the problem-oriented
policing bargain a lot better than the
police executives have.  In fact, we have
line officers to thank for much of the
replication that we have seen. Policing is
a profession that relies heavily on oral tra-
dition, cops learn from talking to one
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“One problem that going
to scale will hopefully
address is the exclusion
of populations that need
our services the most.
Now that we know the
medicine works, we need
to expand the system so
that we can provide the
medicine to everybody
who needs it.”
— James Milliken
another.  We’ve come to the conclusion
that stories are the best training tool—so
at our annual conferences, cops spend the
bulk of their time sharing examples of
what they’re doing.  If you can get enough
of the individual stories out, you can
build a critical mass of support for a new
idea like problem-oriented policing—or
drug courts, for that matter.
Hartmann: Are there other criminal jus-
tice analogies out there?
Stuart: To me, the inescapable historical
analogy is the juvenile court movement,
which succeeded spectacularly in going
to scale.  The first juvenile court opened
in 1899; every state had one within about
twenty years. The most prominent prob-
lems with juvenile courts—as they
became widespread and institutional-
ized—were lack of due process, poor fact
finding, indefinite jurisdiction over peo-
ple based on a small offense, and idiosyn-
cratic judging.  It was a lawless court.  As
we develop drug courts, we need to keep
this experience in mind.
Smith: It might also be useful to bear in
mind that in its earlier days, the juvenile
court was a mechanism thought to be use-
ful in controlling immigrant populations.
It was a strategy for dealing with groups
that were marginalized, and making sure
they stayed that way.  If drug courts are
falling into that part of the pattern, we
may want to be very careful to leave this
form of social control behind when we
take them to scale.  One way to avoid that
problem is to bring drug courts to white
university towns and suburbs, thereby
legitimizing a system which is currently so
pointed at African-American youth.
Scott Newman: I have a different take on
the issue of race.  What we’ve found is
that young African-American males are
opting out of drug court at a dispropor-
tionate rate; they are more likely to say,
“I’ll do my time instead.” They simply
aren’t as fearful of the conventional sys-
tem. 
Hartmann: We’ve brought some outsiders
to this discussion—experts who have
been involved in taking innovative pro-
grams to scale in fields other than crimi-
nal justice.  What have you heard so far?
What lessons can you draw out for us?
Lisbeth Schorr: I see five key lessons
regarding how to go to scale.  The first is
the need to distill the essence of an inno-
vation. Unless you spell out what you’re
doing with some specificity, you can’t
spread the model.  Another lesson is
attention to those elements that don’t
travel easily from site to site.  In many
programs I’ve looked at, one of the essen-
tial components is the practitioners’ belief
in what they’re doing.  You can’t mandate
belief in a program when you replicate or
systematize it, but you must take belief
into account through training.  The third
point is recognizing the importance of
context.  In my experience, the biggest
mistake of replicators is thinking that
because their program is wonderful, the
surroundings won’t destroy it when they
plunk it down in a new place.  But the
surroundings do destroy the program
unless you provide high-quality training.
The context is the most likely saboteur of
the spread of good innovations. Part of
the context that can undermine innova-
tion is the demand for evidence, and what
that demand does to the innovation itself.
The demand for proof by funders, elected
officials, and others has led practitioners
to look for outcomes that are easy to mea-
sure rather than the outcomes they’re
really after.  The fourth point is that prac-
titioners should arm themselves to look
for patterns rather than proof.  As you
begin to notice patterns that reappear
when you have success, and as those
observations accumulate, you can start to
offer some very persuasive evidence, if
not “proof,” of what works.  Finally,
almost all successful scale-up efforts I’ve
seen have had an intermediary organiza-
tion to provide legitimization and to artic-
ulate the essence of the program to be
replicated. The importance of an interme-
diary cannot be underestimated. 
Bernardine Watson: At Public/Private
Ventures, we’re very interested in alterna-
tive strategies for working with high-risk
youth.  We’ve developed three kinds of
criteria for determining whether a pro-
gram is ready for replication.   The first is
the program itself, and whether it actually
addresses the recognized need or prob-
lem.  Clearly this isn’t an issue for drug
courts.  The second is whether it does so
through methods that are considered
credible by the field.  Finally—and this is
the thorny area that Lee Schorr talked
about—we ask whether the program has
proof of success and measurable results.
The social service field has set a very high
bar for how to prove that a program
works: often the field requires a random
assignment study to determine success.
But very few programs can muster this
kind of data.  We were able to do it in the
case of Big Brothers, Big Sisters, an orga-
nization with a well-defined model, a
name brand, and funders willing to invest
the money necessary for long-term and
very expensive research.
Schorr: In the last 20 years, the rhetoric
in the field has really improved.
Everyone knows what they’re supposed
to say about their program.  But that
doesn’t mean they’re actually doing it.
Another function that an intermediary
can play is to go beyond rhetoric in ana-
lyzing what makes a program work.  
ASSETS
Hartmann: Are there reasons to be opti-
mistic about the prospects of drug court
institutionalization? Do courts bring any
particular assets to the business of going
to scale?
Eric Lane:  The evolution of unified state
court systems is one important asset,
because it has allowed the judiciary to
become a real branch of government in
the sense that it can assign resources, del-
egate responsibilities, and make things
like drug courts happen that never would
have been possible 25 years ago. 
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Hartmann: I would nominate a few more
assets.  One is that the judicial system is
independent.  Unlike police departments,
the courts don’t have mayors or the city
council looking over their shoulders.
They have much more freedom and power
than almost any part of the executive
branch.  A second asset is that judges
think in terms of precedent; they’re will-
ing to be guided.  Finally, drug courts have
received a lot of support and encourage-
ment from the federal government.
Kevin Burke: Another asset, I think, is
the willingness of drug courts to be eval-
uated.  People are no longer prone to
make policy by anecdote.  
Stuart:  I think drug courts appeal to peo-
ple’s desire to have hope.  We have seen
an awful lot of criminal justice programs
in recent years that have not worked and
have become more and more punitive.
With drug courts, people see that we’re
not using leeches to cure disease: we’re
switching to antibiotics.  The mainstream
judicial system is still using leeches.
Newman: I would point to the favorable
political climate as an asset.  The public is
much more receptive to this thing than it
used to be.
Roberts: This is true.  You can talk to
almost any drug court professional in the
country, and be told that there have been
favorable newspaper articles and wide-
spread community support for their drug
courts.
Berman: We also know from public opin-
ion surveys that while citizens may not be
aware of what a drug court is per se, they
do approve of the model’s basic elements.
In very high numbers, they like the idea
of judges reaching out to clinicians and
asking their advice on drug cases and
they approve of court-mandated treat-
ment as opposed to incarceration. 
SPREADING THE WORD
Hartmann: Last summer I visited the Red
Hook Community Justice Center, where
it’s easy to see that all the people who
work at the court are true believers in
what they’re doing.  My question is what
happens when the true believers leave?
Can we talk about how to create and per-
petuate local buy-in?
Berman: Whether it’s a community court
like Red Hook or a drug court or some
other kind of innovation, I think it’s pos-
sible to embed the new values we’re talk-
ing about today in architecture, technol-
ogy, and research benchmarks—all kinds
of things other than personnel.  You’ve
got to try to inoculate yourself against the
inevitability of the first generation leav-
ing.
Valerie Raine: Until recently, drug courts
have been created from the grassroots up,
thanks to entrepreneurial judges and
attorneys.  When drug courts are
imposed from the top down, how will
that change things? As you go to scale, do
you take drug courts and make lots of
them, thereby retaining some control
over the process? Or is what we’re seek-
ing a new approach to judicial conduct?
In which case, shouldn’t our efforts be
focused on inculcating this approach into
judicial decision-making in every court-
room? Of course, the risk is losing con-
trol and having what was once an innov-
ative approach become just another case-
processing mill.  These are difficult ques-
tions that don’t have any easy answers.
Schorr: You’re right to be aware that peo-
ple don’t respond well to being told, “You
have to do this.” I would be very leery of
trying to impose the idea of drug courts
on people who don’t want to implement
them.  But it’s a very different thing to say,
“You have to do what is necessary to
implement an idea you’ve already
endorsed.”  You always have to invent
some part of the innovation on site.  You
can’t manufacture the desire to create
something like a drug court from above.
That’s a recipe for disaster. 
Newman: I wonder whether concepts
like problem-solving courts can only be
carried out if you’re directly involved in
building them yourself.  Can you create a
successful drug court—one that incorpo-
rates a process of mutual trust and buy-in
among such diverse parties as judges,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys—
without having everyone build it from the
beginning? 
Roberts: I think it all goes back to train-
ing.  It can be done.  The Department of
Justice assembles training programs to
help people plan drug courts, and we’ve
seen the different stakeholders arrive and
shake hands with each other because it’s
the first time they’ve met.  Some are long-
time enemies.  We watch them go
through a process of learning to appreci-
ate each other’s point of view, and devel-
oping the rudimentary skills of behaving
like a team when they go back home.
Newman: I was part of one of those train-
ing teams several years ago.  I was the
hard-hearted prosecutor; our presiding
judge was the hidebound traditionalist.  I
bonded with our drug court judge when I
found out he snores very loudly on air-
planes.  Even workshop travel was part of
the bonding process!  I think transforma-
tive personal experiences among key fig-
ures are essential to institutionalization.
Watson: All the training in the world
won’t make a difference if the site you’ve
chosen can’t operate the program. In try-
ing to spread drug courts, I think you
have to be careful to pick places where
the capacity exists to implement a new
program. 
Schorr: I’m not sure I agree with you on
this point.  I think you start by looking at
places that really need the innovation and
then try to create the infrastructure to sup-
port it.  I would choose a place that’s needy
over a place that’s ready to innovate.
CONCERNS AND OBSTACLES
Hartmann: We’ve talked a lot about how
you go to scale and how you spread the
word about drug courts.  Before we go
any further, I want to make sure every-
body’s had a chance to air their concerns
about the institutionalization of drug
courts.  What makes you nervous here?
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Smith: I’d be concerned about an over-
reliance on arrests as a way of addressing
drug abuse. There’s an infinite supply of
addicted persons out there.  The more
capacity you create, the more cases you’re
going to have.  There may be no way to
get ahead of demand.  I worry that in cre-
ating drug courts, we may be holding
ourselves back from coming up with
other solutions to the problem.
Newman: I don’t really share your con-
cern.  The idea that a judge in a drug
court would recruit the police into gath-
ering up fodder for his treatment program
and get them to abandon opportunity
deprivation or some other strategy does-
n’t strike me as real.  In Indianapolis, we
do both.
Adele Harrell: My big concern is that
drug courts don’t fall into the trap of
overselling their promise, something I
think we have to guard against very care-
fully.
Michael Dorf: I agree.  What makes us
think a court can solve a complicated
social problem like drug abuse?  The
1960s and ’70s were the high water mark
of optimism in the judiciary’s ability to
address problems like prison overcrowd-
ing, school segregation, and a lack of
mental health treatment services.  What
we’ve seen in the last 20 years or so is
growing skepticism in judges’ ability to
address broad social issues.  
Roberts:  I think we have enough drug
courts.  What we need are more drug
court clients.  Most drug courts are fairly
small experiments.  Are they dealing with
all the people they could be?
Newman: I have a public safety concern
about allowing more serious criminals to
be eligible for drug court.  I get letters
from inmates asking that I let them out
early so they can continue their walk with
Jesus.  My feeling is that Jesus can walk in
a reformatory just as well as outside, and
so too can drug treatment. 
Burke: I think there’s a need to continue
to explain to the 25,000 trial judges
around the country that a drug court is an
enjoyable assignment.  Without that buy-
in, you won’t be able to build momentum
to expand drug courts.  Judges also need
cover, because this is a profession that
doesn’t encourage risk-taking and falling
flat on your face.  
Dorf: Another potential problem with
going to scale is that drug courts today
operate by penalty default —they use the
threat of incarceration to get people to
enter the program.  If you go to scale, you
take away that option.  Entering drug
court would no longer be voluntary. 
Smith: I have a slightly different take on
this question.  Today’s innovation is
tomorrow’s conventional wisdom—the
standard operational procedure that’s des-
perately in need of change.  I think we
need to find a way to go to scale that’s
open to constant change, revision, and
discovery.  Otherwise, you just make it
more difficult for the next innovator.
Lane: That’s a very important point.  I
think drug courts are going to fail at some
point.  The question is how much good
we do within that time frame and
whether we’re preparing an end game for
the next innovation to come forward.
TREATMENT
Hartmann: Expanding the drug court
approach will inevitably require new con-
nections with the treatment community.
What kind of challenges are presented by
partnerships with treatment providers?
Burke: Accountability is one challenge.
Drug courts hold the defendants account-
able, but don’t always do a good job of
holding the treatment provider account-
able.
Harrell: I agree.  I think we have a real
issue of quality control.  When you start
dealing with several thousand people
instead of several hundred, you have to
figure out how the courts can set up the
right mechanisms to ensure treatment
quality, and that treatment programs are
holding offenders accountable.  We’re fac-
ing a serious problem with drug treat-
ment capacity right now; some programs
have a staff turnover rate of 50% each
year.
Chico Gallegos: One major problem with
ensuring effective drug treatment is that
many assessment tools don’t take into
account the specific cultures and popula-
tions drug courts are dealing with.
Cultural competence is important among
both treatment providers and court per-
sonnel.
Roberts: Another issue is the question of
where treatment begins and ends.  Drug
courts have expanded the concept of
treatment beyond its traditional defini-
tion.  With drug courts the goal is not
simply to get participants sober, as it
might be in a straight-up treatment pro-
gram, because then you just end up with
a sober criminal.  The idea is to work on
the behavior that is problematic to the
community.  So for drug courts the goal is
not just sobriety but also law-abiding
behavior. 
Harrell: Flexible thinking about treat-
ment is key.  Over the next few years, our
ideas are going to change as knowledge in
the field grows.  The process of being able
to react to and incorporate these changes
in the definition of effective treatment
should be part of how we think about
taking drug courts to scale.  
LEADERSHIP
Hartmann: Where is the leadership going
to come from to expand drug court pro-
grams? Can the judiciary do it by itself?
Daniel Becker: In Utah the leadership for
drug courts originates from a judicial
council that first put in place certain
broad definitions—one being that our
drug courts would be post-plea, and
another being that treatment would
remain an executive branch function.
Those definitions helped transform the
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drug court judge from rogue status to
legitimacy.  More and more judges have
since begun to express interest in drug
courts.  We are now reaching a critical
mass.  We have enough people engaged in
the programs that we need much more
intensive resources than what we’ve been
working with up to this point.  In our
state, that need has meant bringing the
legislature into play—and as the state
becomes more involved in the adminis-
tration of drug courts, a tension has
developed between accountability and
real innovation.
Hartmann: How valuable is something
like the endorsement of problem-solving
courts by all 50 state court chief judges
and court administrators in convincing
more people that the model is worth the
investment?
Burke: The fact of the matter is that the
Conference of Chief Justices is a pretty
conservative group.  This may be the first
time they’ve passed an endorsement that
is pro-active in nature, and it has been a
great help in getting people’s attention.
As soon as it was passed, I went back to
our judicial council in Minnesota and
was able to argue that it was time to move
our drug courts away from “pilot” status.
Stuart: Judicial support is obviously key,
but it seems inevitable that state court
systems will have to devise a strategy for
approaching the state legislature.  Federal
grant money alone won’t bring drug
courts to scale over the next five years. 
William Vickrey: In California, we have
been fortunate to get the legislature to
fund a separate committee to serve as the
institutional voice on the planning, advo-
cacy, and guidance of drug courts.  We
also have legislation, initiated by the
courts, that created a joint committee of
the Department of Alcohol and Drugs and
the judiciary to oversee drug court fund-
ing. 
Becker: In Utah, we’ve passed a statute
allocating 13% of every dollar of state
funding dedicated to drug court to gen-
eral court operations—to be spent by the
judiciary, and 87% to testing, treatment,
and case management—to be spent by
the Department of Human Services. I pre-
dict that states that successfully redirect
federal money for substance abuse and
treatment into the drug court arena will
be the frontrunners in drug court institu-
tionalization.
Raine: That’s a critical issue.  Health and
Human Services block grants bring huge
amounts of funding to state alcohol and
drug agencies.  Going to scale will be next
to impossible without involving the com-
missioners of these agencies.   
Hartmann: Scott, if you were the czar of
drug courts in Indiana, what would you
want from your state legislature?
Newman: I think it’s important to be care-
ful how you define what’s being taken to
scale.  A bill in Indiana has proposed cod-
ifying the ten components of drug courts
into law.  While I understand the urge, I
don’t think it’s appropriate.  I would
instead structure the law to create an
intermediary body that would help certify
drug courts as well as provide incentives
for their implementation.  When Indiana
created public defender commissions, for
example, we allowed counties to tap into
additional state funds if they had estab-
lished a legitimate program.  We pre-
served for each county the ability to cre-
ate, within broad parameters, qualify for
matching funds, and work with an inter-
mediary that was responsible for articu-
lating standards.  This approach avoids
some of the problems of bureaucracy.  
Dorf: On that note, I think one of the
central challenges of going to scale is to
have “bigness” and coordination without
bureaucracy—and that’s where the idea of
an intermediary comes from.  An inter-
mediary can assess what’s happening in
the field; gather detailed, accurate infor-
mation from local players; develop some
sense of what the best practices are; and
relay that information back to the players.
This is the kind of institutional architec-
ture I think you need if you want to move
from a system based on charisma to one
based on standards and principles.
Hartmann: Lee, let me put you on the
spot.  Institutionalization versus bureau-
cratization.  What’s the difference?
Schorr: If I knew, I would have written
another book about it!  That’s a very hard
question to answer.  The term bureau-
cracy carries a negative connotation
today that it didn’t have in the Progressive
Era.  I think when we use a word like
institutionalize, what we’re suggesting is
that we find the time and opportunity to
allow for local variation and to move
away from excessive rigidity.
Newman: To me, bureaucracy creates a
coercive style of leadership that forces
other people to act in a certain way.
Institutionalization is a motivational style
of leadership, which gets people inspired
and allows them to build their own teams
and create programs with some flexibility.
You have to move beyond that to a system
less dependent on leadership, or you’ll
end up with a coercive situation in which
other people feel they have to act a cer-
tain way.  I think we all favor the kind of
leadership that allows people some flexi-
bility. 
LOOKING AHEAD
Hartmann: Where do you want drug
courts to be in five years, and what single
significant investment would you make
to get them there?
Traficanti: In New York, my goal is to dis-
appear by 2003, leaving in place the
resources and infrastructure necessary for
local sites to carry the drug court idea for-
ward. In five years, I would like to see—
in every state and across the country—
the resources available for any defendant,
in any jurisdiction, to go into treatment.
This can be achieved by making it possi-
ble for judges to electronically access
information from the bench, including
available program slots and available
beds.
“In five years, I would
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jurisdiction, to go into
treatment.  This can be
achieved . . . .”
— Joseph Traficanti, Jr.
Milliken: My goal is for every sentencing
judge to have access to an assessment of
the defendant that allows him to decide
whether to make treatment a part of the
sentence.  In order for that to happen, we
need state funding for treatment for the
adult criminal population.
Smith: I would like to see the idea that
sentencing is a responsibility of the court
over a prolonged period of time gain
wider currency.
Newman: The single most important
investment that drug courts could make is
in management information systems.
Building more uniform operating systems
for drug treatment courts would really
advance the ball on institutionalization.  
Becker: I’d like to see less emphasis
placed on drug courts per se, and more
emphasis on making treatment a main-
stream enterprise by developing partner-
ships between courts and state agencies
that oversee treatment. 
Lane: I’d like to find a way to define suc-
cess, figure out how to measure it, and
then invest in the tools to measure it.  We
would then have an opportunity to really
find out what it means for a drug court to
“work.”
Scott: I would love criminal justice practi-
tioners to understand their roles more
broadly than they currently do.
Prosecutors should see themselves as
more than just the chief law enforcement
officers, but also chief lawyers who help
us think about community standards and
public safety.  Judges should see them-
selves not just as decision-makers but as
concerned leaders of the community.
Gallegos: I’d like to see evidence that drug
courts have made inroads in the broader,
loftier goal of rebuilding communities. 
Stuart: I would like to see every court in
my state thinking of itself as a substance
abuse court, and operating with the kind
of consciousness about these issues that
we’ve been talking about today.  The
investment to be made is in the time
needed to talk about what the justice sys-
tem is really doing and whether it’s work-
ing. 
Harrell: I share the vision of making this
a way of doing business across the justice
system, and maybe even fading drug
courts out of existence as their tenets
become embedded in practice. 
Schorr: I feel very envious of all of you
because this is a far better, more rigorous
discussion that I am used to hearing.  And
as I walk away from this table, I think
what’s most exciting is the idea that drug
courts open doors for the court system in
general to become more problem-solving,
in terms of thinking more broadly about
problems and solutions.  
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I. MONETARY TERMS
Most settlements involve payment of money by the defen-
dant to the plaintiff.  At the time a settlement is reached, the
parties agree on how much is to be paid.  This is generally a
straightforward pronouncement such as, defendant agrees to
pay plaintiff $100,000.  However, there are a number of addi-
tional monetary issues, which should also be discussed and
resolved.  First, parties should agree to the timing of the pay-
ment and whether payment will be made at the time of the
exchange of the executed settlement documents or some other
date.  Second, parties should agree as to whether payment will
be made in a lump sum or installments.  Third, if the settlement
contemplates installment payments, the parties should discuss
how the agreement will be enforced in the event of default.
Will the court retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement or
will a separate action be necessary?3
Fourth, the parties should also agree whether the settlement
amount includes plaintiff’s attorney fees and in whose name to
issue the check.  Alternatives include payment to the attorney’s
client trust account, to the attorney and client jointly, or
directly to the client.
Fifth, the parties should discuss how they intend to treat the
payments for tax purposes.  Does a portion of the settlement
proceeds constitute wages for which withholding taxes will be
taken?  Will the defendant be issuing an IRS 1099 form and if
so, in whose name and tax ID number?  The characterization of
the payments in the settlement agreement can have significant
tax implications.  For example, the circuits are split on the
issue of whether a contingent fee is part of the client’s taxable
income.4 The success of a settlement agreement may depend on
a thorough discussion and consensus as to payments in light of
their inherent tax implications.5
Sixth, parties should verify whether there are any lien
claims to the settlement proceeds and if so, whether and how
they will be satisfied.  Defendants and their insurance carriers
Have you ever attended a settlement conference and comeaway thinking the case was settled, only to later find outthat your adversary has a different understanding of the
settlement terms than you and your client?  This is a frustrat-
ing experience, but is completely unnecessary.  Careful lawyers
and judges prevent such confusion by ironing out the details of
a settlement at the time an agreement is reached.  Leaving spe-
cific settlement terms unresolved to a later date may result in
an unenforceable settlement or possible litigation to enforce the
settlement.1
Settlement conferences play an important role in the resolu-
tion of litigated disputes.  Judges and mediators spend numer-
ous hours and even days working with parties to bring about a
settlement.  With only 2.2 percent of all federal civil cases going
to trial, settlement is the predominate means by which cases are
resolved.2 Although most cases are settled by the parties with-
out direct involvement by the court, numerous cases are settled
with the assistance of the court or mediators at a settlement
conference or court-sponsored mediation. 
This article explains the steps parties and the court should
take to insure an enforceable settlement.  By paying careful
attention to all necessary issues for resolution at the time a set-
tlement is reached, parties can prevent future misunderstand-
ing and conflict over the settlement terms.  The principal issues
parties face at the time a settlement is reached include 1) mon-
etary terms; 2) scope of releases; 3) confidentiality of the set-
tlement terms; 4) disposition of the litigation; 5) enforcement
of the settlement; and 6) documenting of the settlement.  This
article explores these issues and strongly suggests that parties
discuss, resolve, and memorialize the understandings reached
at the settlement conference or as soon thereafter as is practi-
cable in order to minimize later problems.  A settlement check-
list is provided for parties to use at the conclusion of the set-
tlement conference.  The use of a settlement checklist can assist
parties and the court in accomplishing this goal.
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Footnotes 
1. Higbee v. Sentry Ins. Co., 253 F.3d 994, 999-1000 (7th Cir. 2002)
(no settlement was reached where three material issues were left
unresolved at settlement conference with court). 
2. Hope Viner Samborn, The Vanishing Trial, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2002, at
25-26.  From 1996 to 2000 the total number of federal civil trials
declined 23 percent.  2000 U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR
25.
3. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994)
(holding that where case is dismissed, court loses jurisdiction to
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enforce settlement unless compliance with settlement is made
part of the dismissal order or the court specifically retains juris-
diction to enforce the settlement contract). 
4. Kenseth v. Comm’r, 259 F.3d 881, 883 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding
the contingent fee amount is taxable as to the client and citing
cases evidencing the circuit split).
5. See Young v. Comm’r, 240 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2001).  “[The plain-
tiff’s] anticipatory assignment of a portion of her settlement pro-
ceeds to her attorney does not foreclose taxation of those pro-
ceeds . . . .”  Id at 377.  Further, the issue of which party was
responsible for paying capital gains taxes resulting from the
appreciation of property transferred pursuant to the settlement
agreement was also decided.  Id. at 379-80.
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may not make payments if there is an unresolved issue con-
cerning attorney liens.6
Finally, in personal injury cases, parties may consider struc-
tured settlements, which provide for payments over a specified
period of time.  The question of who and how the structured
settlement will be funded should be resolved.7
II. THE FORM AND SCOPE OF RELEASES
Releases are an important topic to be discussed and resolved
at the settlement table.  In a personal injury case or where
there is no ongoing relationship between the parties, a general
release of all claims, whether or not raised in the litigation, is
usually requested.  A general release of claims covers “all
claims of which a signing party has actual knowledge or that
he could have discovered upon reasonable inquiry.”8 Where
the parties have an ongoing relationship, they may seek to
limit the scope of the release to the claims raised in the litiga-
tion.  Defining the breadth of the release can be instrumental
in both the prevention of and prevailing in future litigation.9
In addition, the question of whether the release will be a one-
way or mutual release can also arise.  For example, in an
employment discrimination case, a terminated former
employee may request his ex-employer to provide a mutual
release to prevent future claims arising out of his past employ-
ment conduct.  Many defendants contemplate receiving a
release but not giving one.
In certain circumstances, parties prefer a covenant not to
sue rather than a release.  Where the litigation is resolved as to
one party, but is continuing as to other parties, a covenant not
to sue may avoid the problem of inadvertently releasing a
remaining party.10
III. CONFIDENTIALITY
Confidentiality is a frequent issue in settlements.
Oftentimes, defendants insist upon confidentiality of the set-
tlement terms because they are fearful of encouraging others to
bring similar actions against them.  Frequently, confidentiality
is not discussed, but appears in the draft of the settlement agree-
ment from defendant on the assumption plaintiff will not
object.11 However, if a term appears in the written agreement
that was not previously orally agreed upon, it is unenforce-
able.12 Therefore it is crucial that all terms be thoroughly dis-
cussed and defined.
A confidentiality provision raises a number of issues.  First, is
the provision mutual?  Second, what can the parties say?  Are
they permitted to disclose the fact of settlement without disclos-
ing the terms?  Can they say the dispute has been resolved, noth-
ing, or refer all inquiries to defendant?  What exceptions to con-
fidentiality will be permitted?  Generally, exceptions are made
for disclosures to attorneys, accountants, and close family mem-
bers and by order of court.  A confidential settlement agreement
may be disclosed if it is filed in court and ordered sealed.13
Another frequent issue is the question of damages in the
event of a breach.  Defendants frequently seek liquidated dam-
ages as a method of insuring compliance with the confidential-
ity provision.  The question of the enforceability of such a pro-
vision arises when it becomes a penalty.14
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF THE SETTLEMENT AND 
DISPOSITION OF LITIGATION
A settlement agreement is a contract.  If a settlement agree-
ment is breached the aggrieved party does not want to file a new
lawsuit to enforce the agreement. Therefore, parties should dis-
cuss the proposed enforcement mechanism.  Among the meth-
ods used are an order allowing the court to retain jurisdiction,
a dismissal of the underlying litigation without prejudice until
the settlement is completed, or a consent decree.  A federal
court loses jurisdiction over the case unless the dismissal order
includes a provision specifically retaining jurisdiction, requir-
ing compliance, or incorporating the settlement into the dis-
missal order.15
The issue of the disposition of the litigation is tied into the
issue of settlement enforcement.  Most defendants require a dis-
missal of the litigation with prejudice to protect against a refiling
6. Neuberg v. Michael Reese Hosp. Foundation, 123 F.3d 951, 953
(7th Cir. 1997). 
7. See Gregory Scott Crespi, Selling Structured Settlements: The
Uncertain Effect of Anti-Assignment Clauses, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 787
(2001) (discussing the widespread practice and the resulting liti-
gation caused by plaintiffs, who have entered into structured set-
tlements, later attempt to assign deferred payment rights to a
finance company in exchange for a lump sum).
8. Howington v. Ghourdjian, No. 00 C 7394, 2002 WL 1793648 at
*2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2002) (quoting Fair v. Int’l Flavors &
Fragrances, Inc., 905 F.2d 1114, 1116 (7th Cir.1990):  “A general
release is inapplicable to unknown claims.”).  Farm Credit Bank
of St. Louis v. Whitlock, 581 N.E.2d 664, 667, 144 Ill. 2d 440, 448
(Ill. 1991).
9. See Blockley v. The Work Center, Inc., No. 99 C 1421, 2000 WL
127118 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that the release is not limited to
back injuries sustained during the course of employment because
the language “any and all” back injuries is comprehensive).
10. Aiken v. Insull, 122 F.2d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 1941).  “[A] covenant
not to sue is not the same as a release, and has no effect upon the
liability of the other wrongdoers to the injured person . . . .” Id.
11. See Meek & Assoc., Inc., v. First Union Ins. Group, No. 99-2519-
CM, 2002 WL 1998204 (D. Kan. Aug. 6, 2002).  Although the
parties had orally reached an agreement as to the essential terms
of the settlement, their actions and statements did not demon-
strate their intent to make the agreement confidential.  Id. at *3.
12. See Defalco v. Oak Lawn Public Library, No. 99 CV 02137, 2000
WL 263922 (N.D. Ill.  Mar. 1, 2000).  Orally, an agreement in
principle was reached, however the court held that the subse-
quent written agreement was unenforceable because there was no
meeting of the minds with respect to the meaning of the confi-
dentiality agreement and scope of release.  Id. at *1, *5.
13. See Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2002) (requiring
disclosure to intervening newspaper of confidential settlement
agreement sealed by district court).
14. See Checkers Eight Ltd. Partnership v. Hawkins, 241 F.3d 558,
562 (7th Cir. 2001).  A provision in an agreement is a liquidated
damages clause if “(1) the actual damages from a breach are diffi-
cult to measure at the time the contract was made; and (2) the
specified amount of damages is reasonable in light of the antici-
pated or actual loss caused by the breach.”  Id.
15. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994).
and settlement draft will be prepared and a time by which other
parties may raise objections.  Courtesy copies should be sent to
the court and firm dates should be set for completion of the set-
tlement documents.  The shorter the time frame the better.
The party representative’s authority to enter into the settle-
ment should be confirmed at the settlement conference.  If the
client is not present, the attorney should be required to demon-
strate that she has express authority to settle the lawsuit or the
client should be made available by telephone to confirm her
agreement to the settlement terms.  In certain jurisdictions, the
authority of an attorney to represent a client in litigation is sep-
arate from the authority to compromise and settle the lawsuit.20
VI. CONCLUSION
Once an agreement is reached at a settlement conference,
the real work begins.  Counsel and the court must take the time
to meet and review all settlement terms and confirm the under-
standings reached while all parties are present.  The agreement
should be placed on the record or memorialized in a contem-
poraneous writing.  Failure to do so can lead to lost settlements
and needless litigation.
Morton Denlow has been a magistrate judge in
the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division,
in Chicago since 1996.  Before his appointment,
he was a trial and appellate lawyer in complex
commercial litigation for 24 years.  He gradu-
ated cum laude from the Northwestern
University School of Law in 1972.  He can be
contacted at morton_denlow@ilnd.uscourts.gov.
of the same claims.  However, if the litigation is dismissed with
prejudice, a new action may be necessary to enforce the settle-
ment.16 This can be a problem where installment payments over
a period of time are called for under the settlement.  The court
retains jurisdiction to enforce a settlement where the parties’
obligation to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement
are made part of the dismissal order either by 1) a provision
retaining jurisdiction over the settlement agreement, 2) a provi-
sion requiring compliance with the settlement agreement, or 3)
incorporation of the terms of the agreement into the order.17
V. CONFIRMING AND DOCUMENTING SETTLEMENT
Once a settlement is reached during a conference, the court
should bring the parties together to confirm all terms.  An
important issue concerns how the settlement terms will be
memorialized.  One option is to place all of the settlement
terms on the record in open court.18 This approach is prob-
lematic where a party seeks to keep the settlement terms confi-
dential.  Once the agreement is placed on the record, it
becomes quite difficult to prevent a third party from obtaining
access.19
A second option is to attempt to memorialize the settlement
terms in writing.  Attached, as Exhibit A, is a Settlement
Checklist/Term Sheet, which can be completed and signed at
the settlement conference.  While there is no guarantee the set-
tlement will not later fall apart, the more comprehensive the
terms reached at the settlement conference, the less likely
future problems will arise.  The checklist can also be used by
the court to make sure all important issues are discussed dur-
ing the settlement conference.  A third option is to specify a
date by which a written confirmation of the settlement terms
16 Court Review - Fall 2002
16. See Miener v. Missouri Dep’t of Mental Health, 62 F.3d 1126,
1127-28 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that the district court did not
have jurisdiction to enforce settlement where dismissal order did
not require compliance with settlement agreement and where
jurisdiction was not retained).
17. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381.
18. See Lynch, Inc. v. Samatamason Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 490-91 (7th
Cir. 2002) (at the end of a successful settlement conference the
judge should call in a court reporter and dictate the terms of the
settlement, and make sure the parties agree).
19. See Jessup, 277 F.3d at 929 (granting a newspaper publisher access
to a settlement agreement that had been sealed and deposited in
federal court).
20. Brewer v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 649 N.E.2d 1331, 1333-34, 165
Ill. 2d 100, 105 (Ill. 1995) (holding no settlement was reached where
client did not give attorney express authority to agree to terms).
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JUDGE’S SETTLEMENT CHECKLIST/TERM SHEET
CASE NAME:_________________________________________vs. ____________________________________________________
CASE NO. _________ CV ______________________________DATE: ________________________________________________
A.      PAYMENT OF MONEY TO: ______________________________FROM: _________________________________________
1.  Total amount to be paid: $ _____________________________________________________________________________
2.  When: ______________________________________________________________________________________________
3.  Payment terms: ______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
4.  Does payment include attorney’s fees?   Yes or No _________________________________________________________
5.  Any third party liens to be paid from proceeds?   Yes or No __________________________________________________
6.  Tax Treatment: _______________________________________________________________________________________
7.  Other payment terms: ________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
B. RELEASE / COVENANT NOT TO SUE (circle one)
1.  a) One Way or (b) Mutual: ____________________________________________________________________________
2.  Scope of Release:
a. General: __________________________________________________________________________________________
1) All claims raised in the litigation, or
2) All claims, whether or not raised in the litigation.
b. Limited: __________________________________________________________________________________________
3.  Scope of Covenant: ________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
4.  Exceptions:_______________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
5. Other Terms: ______________________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
C. CONFIDENTIALITY: Yes or No _______________________ MUTUAL: Yes or No ____________________________________
1.  What can be said about litigation?
a. Dispute amicably resolved, or
b. Nothing, or
c. Other: ____________________________________________________________________________________________
2.  Exceptions to confidentiality: __________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
3.  Liquidated damages in event of breach: Yes or No __________________________________________________________
4.  Amount: $ _________________________________________________________(Not too large to avoid being a penalty)
5.  Other confidentiality terms: ____________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
D. ENFORCEMENT OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT BY COURT
1.  Do parties desire court to retain jurisdiction to enforce settlement agreement? Yes or No __________________________
2.  If yes, do parties agree that dismissal order will (should include at least one):
a. Provide for retention of jurisdiction by the court to enforce?  Yes or No ____________________________________
b. Require compliance with the settlement agreement?  Yes or No ___________________________________________
c.  Incorporate terms of settlement agreement into dismissal order?  Yes or No ________________________________
E. DISPOSITION OF LITIGATION:
1.  Dismissal of litigation:  a) with prejudice or  b) without prejudice.
2.  Dismissal without prejudice with leave to reinstate litigation on or before __________ for the purpose of: a) proceeding
with the litigation or b) enforcing the settlement.  In the event a motion to reinstate is not filed on or before above
date, dismissal becomes with prejudice.
3.  Other terms regarding disposition of litigation: ____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
F. CONFIRMING AND DOCUMENTING SETTLEMENT:
1. Do parties wish to place settlement on the record?   Yes or No ________________________________________________
2.  Settlement terms to be confirmed in writing?   Yes or No ____________________________________________________
(a) Draft agreement to be prepared by _________________________________________________________________
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and sent to other parties on or before __________________________________________________________________
(b) Other parties to respond by _______________________________________________________________________
3.  Final settlement agreement to be executed on or before: _____________________________________________________
4.  Will settlement agreement be filed in court? Yes or No ______________________________________________________
5.  Other terms regarding documenting settlement: ____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
G. EFFECTIVE DATE: 
1.  A binding agreement today; or
2.  No binding agreement until settlement agreement is fully documented and signed.
H. FULL AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT? Yes or No
Identify party representatives and title:
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
I. OTHER SETTLEMENT TERMS:
1.  No admission of liability._______________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
J. EMPLOYMENT CASES
1.  Ability to reapply: Yes or No _______________________ 2) Type of reference: ________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
K. NEXT COURT DATE: 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
AGREED TO: AGREED TO:
________________________________________ __________________________________________________
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1. See Madison B. McClellan, Merit Appointment Versus Popular
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43 FLA. L. REV. 529, 54 (quoting the Florida Bar’s definition of
“merit selection” as “a method for selecting judges solely on the
basis of merit rather than through the popular election process”).
2. See id. at 533-39.
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417 (2000).
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In the November 2000 election, the citizens of Florida hadthe opportunity to switch from the  nonpartisan elective sys-tem to a merit selection and retention system for selecting
trial judges in their respective circuits and counties.  Although
the majority of Florida voters favored electing their trial judges,
this issue has spurred intense debate in the legal community
concerning which is the better method for judicial selection.
The crux of the debate centers on whether the judiciary should
be independent or accountable to the public.  On one end of the
spectrum, judges are seen as heads of a branch of government
that should be accountable to the citizens of their jurisdiction.
On the opposite end, judges are viewed as different in that
ethics, and not politics, dictate their governmental role.  It is
this ideological disparity that fostered the creation of the merit
selection and retention system.
Prior to the November election, the merit system was being
promoted as a great compromise of both ideologies.  Merit
selection is a form of direct appointment and is intended to pre-
serve judicial independence.  Merit retention is a form of pop-
ular election and is intended to encourage accountability.
Although the merit system comprises two distinct methods of
judicial selection to serve both interests, it is ineffective for
judicial selection.  Specifically, merit selection increases the pol-
itics that encompass direct appointment, and merit retention
revisits the campaign issues that plague popular elections.
However, some significant changes in the merit system would
make it more effective for judicial selection.
MERIT SELECTION
The concept of merit selection evolved from the direct
appointment method used in the federal system for judicial
selection.  However, merit selection replaces the appointive role
of the executive branch with an independent nominating com-
mission who select judges solely on the basis of merit.1
Although the idea for merit selection was proposed in the early
1900s, it wasn’t until 1976 when Florida adopted this method
for selection of appellate judges.2 Proponents contend that
merit selection retains the benefits of direct appointment, i.e.,
judicial independence.3 However, the very element that
ensures judicial independence, i.e., appointment, also threat-
ens judicial independence because of its political tendencies.
The Merit Selection Method
The current merit selection method used to select Florida’s
appellate judges is the same as that proposed in November’s elec-
tion for selecting trial judges.4 Basically, this method uses judi-
cial nominating commissions, which are formed for each judi-
cial circuit and district around the state, including one for the
supreme court, in the event of a vacancy.5 Each commission is
composed of lawyers and lay persons for the purpose of recruit-
ing, investigating, and screening judicial candidates.6 The com-
mission selects between three to six most qualified judicial can-
didates and submits the list to the governor.7 The governor then
appoints one judge from the list of nominees.8 To understand
the “merit” element of this method of judicial selection, we must
discuss the nominating procedures in more detail. 
JNC Membership
Each judicial nominating commission (hereinafter, “JNC”)
consists of nine members who are appointed in groups of three
from three separate appointing authorities.9 First, the governor
appoints three JNC members, who consist of lawyers and lay
persons.10 Those persons interested in a gubernatorial
appointment to a JNC must complete and submit an executive
appointment application to the governor’s office.11 Once all
applications have been received, the governor’s legal office
reviews the applications and informally interviews the appli-
cants.12 The legal office then discusses the applicants with the
governor and makes recommendations for appointment.13 The
governor then selects three people for appointment to a JNC.14
Next, the Florida Bar’s Board of Governors appoints three
Florida Bar members.15 Those attorneys interested in serving
on a JNC must complete and submit an application.16 Once all
of the applications are received, the Board of Governors forms
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a screening committee to review the applications and make
recommendations to the board for each JNC vacancy.17 The
board then decides on three lawyers to serve on a JNC.18
The final three JNC members are lay persons appointed by
a majority vote of the six members previously appointed by the
governor and the Florida Bar.19 These members also complete
and submit an application.20 Once all of the applications are
received, the six JNC members conduct their own screening
and interviewing process to determine the three remaining
JNC members.21 Diversity in JNC membership is encouraged
but not mandatory.   Legislation that mandated the appoint-
ment of at least one minority from each of the three separate
appointing authorities was ruled unconstitutional.22
Once a person is appointed to serve on a JNC, he or she is
required to attend the “JNC Institute” for proper training.23
The Florida Bar conducts this “institute,” which is a one-day
training seminar held at least once a year that is designed to
educate new JNC members on the nominating process.24 In
addition to educational training, the seminar also provides an
opportunity for commissioners to discuss improvements in the
JNC process.25
The JNC Screening Process
The purpose of JNCs is to recruit, investigate, and screen
judicial candidates to fill vacancies on the bench.26 Currently,
the only legal requirement for most judicial candidates is that
they must be members of the Florida Bar for at least five
years.27 However, the JNCs also consider a nonexclusive list of
criteria set forth in the uniform rules28 and conduct extensive
background investigations and personal interviews subject to
the uniform rules.29
The JNC screening process begins when judicial candi-
dates submit a comprehensive application to the JNC of rele-
vant jurisdiction.30 Since the application does not request
information regarding race or ethnicity,31 diversity among the
applicants is encouraged through notices to minority bar
associations.32 Once all of the applications are received, the
JNC determines if the applicants meet the initial legal
requirements for the office
and conducts extensive back-
ground investigations on the
candidates.33
The background investiga-
tions of the judicial candidates
vary depending upon the
vacancy.  For instance, a
vacancy on the supreme court
may require a more extensive
background check than would a judgeship for a district court
of appeal or circuit court.34 Once the background investiga-
tion is complete, the JNC then personally interviews the can-
didates.35 These interviews are open to the public and are usu-
ally announced in local papers or on a notice posted at the
courthouse.36 Each JNC can employ its own interviewing
process subject to the uniform rules.37 These interviews are
notoriously arduous and involve tough personal and profes-
sional questions that usually address sensitive social issues.38
Once the investigations and interviews are complete, a major-
ity vote of the JNC members determines the final list of at least
three judicial nominees.39 This list is then submitted to the
governor in alphabetical order without any ranking or addi-
tional recommendations.40
Upon receiving the list of nominees from the JNC, the gov-
ernor’s legal office begins its screening and interviewing
process.41 The intensity of this screening process depends on
the judicial vacancy.42 Once the investigations and interviews
are complete, the governor meets with the legal office and then
appoints one nominee from the final list to fill the judicial
vacancy.43
Arguments Regarding Merit Selection
The ideological debate between judicial independence and
accountability is an interesting one.  Advocates for merit selec-
tion contend that an appointment system for judicial selection
preserves judicial independence by minimizing political influ-
ence, ensures judicial quality through an autonomous screen-
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ing process, and promotes
judicial diversity through
rules and persistence.44
Opponents argue that merit
selection sacrifices account-
ability and merely substitutes
one political system of selec-
tion for another.  Although
arguments for both sides are
convincing, the contention
that merit selection preserves judicial independence fails.
The main argument supporting merit selection is that it
retains judicial independence because the process minimizes
political influence.45 However, any kind of political influence,
no matter how slight, jeopardizes judicial independence.  The
problem lies primarily with the JNCs’ current nominating pro-
cedures, which create an atmosphere that is ripe for political
influence and manipulation.  This potential for abuse is evi-
denced in several incidents involving judicial candidates, JNC
members, and the selection process.
For example, in 1996, a lay member of a JNC in Ft.
Lauderdale resigned his position after a newspaper uncovered
his failure to reveal his past business relationship with a can-
didate for circuit court.46 Specifically, the JNC member had
once been president, and the judicial candidate vice president,
of a now-defunct firm in downtown Ft. Lauderdale.47 In fact,
this past business relationship was not uncovered until after
the candidate made the final list of nominees.48 Currently, the
uniform rules mandate JNC members to disclose to the JNC
panel all personal, professional, and business relationships
with an applicant.49 But there is no law that requires such dis-
closure.50
Another incident that raised suspicion with JNC operations
occurred in 1997, where Governor Chiles appointed an indi-
vidual to a JNC before the vacancy was even announced.51 The
former JNC member kept his resignation of his JNC position a
secret from the public and the other JNC members out of def-
erence to Governor Chiles who appointed him.52 However,
Governor Chiles appointed a new JNC member before the res-
ignation or the JNC opening was made official.53 Even more
strange was the fact that the new JNC appointee was a long-
time political friend of the former JNC member.54 Although
both JNC members and the governor denied any wrongdoing,
the mere appearance of impropriety spoke volumes.55
Probably the strongest example of the potential for politi-
cal manipulation on JNCs is an incident that occurred in
1996 in Palm Beach.56 Suspicion of the JNC began with the
commission’s recommendation of three judicial candidates
who were conspicuously unqualified.57 In fact, the JNC chair
sent Governor Chiles a letter apologizing for the selection,
which then prompted a formal investigation into the JNC’s
operations.58 Shortly thereafter, the commission quickly
ousted their chairman in a secret meeting.59 Although the
investigation was hampered due to uncooperative JNC mem-
bers and lack of evidence, it was revealed that one of the
three judicial nominees was the wife of a member of the
Florida Bar’s Board of Governors.60 Further, this board mem-
ber-husband was instrumental in appointing two attorneys to
the JNC who, in turn, effectively advocated the wife for a
judgeship.61 Also, one of the JNC’s strongest supporters of
the wife’s judgeship was a long-time political friend of the
husband.62 Additionally, there were allegations that during
the wife’s interview with JNC members, some members
“shepherded” the wife past questions addressing several dis-
crepancies on her judicial application.63 Nonetheless, even
though some critics called for the disbandment of the JNC,64
the commission continued operating.65
Besides JNC membership, another source for political influ-
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ence are the closed JNC deliberations.66 Interestingly, school
board deliberations regarding appointment of a new superin-
tendent are constitutionally required to be open to the pub-
lic.67 However, JNC deliberations regarding the selection of
judicial nominees are currently closed to the public.68
Naturally, this secrecy could facilitate backroom dealing and
foster public distrust.69 This was evident in the incident
involving the Palm Beach JNC and a recent incident involving
the Fifth District Court of Appeal JNC.  In 1999, a JNC mem-
ber spoke out against the actions of two JNC colleagues who
had personal meetings with sitting appellate judges to gather
facts regarding judicial candidates.70 It was argued that
although judicial ethics allow judges to communicate “factu-
ally and succinctly” to the JNC, the appearance of impropriety
is manifest because the meetings were conducted privately.71
Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that closed JNC delibera-
tions would also create the appearance of impropriety, as well
as perpetuate public distrust of JNC operations and fuel suspi-
cions of favoritism and political maneuvering.72
Finally, another source for potential political abuse in JNCs
is the considerable opportunity for lobbying.  Currently, there
is no rule censuring contact with JNC members during the
nomination process.73 Consequently, former JNC members
report receiving numerous phone calls and letters from the
candidate’s friends, relatives, clients, and influential commu-
nity leaders.74 Also, there were some incidents where the can-
didates themselves would attempt direct contact with a JNC
member.75 But efforts have been made to curb lobbying efforts
of JNCs.  Recently, the Judicial Nominating Procedures
Committee discussed developing an advisory letter that would
inform candidates as to what constitutes appropriate contact
with JNC members.76 Nonetheless, until a rule limiting con-
tact between JNC members and judicial candidates or their
supporters is implemented, merit selection has the potential of
becoming a lobbying contest instead of a merit contest.77
The apparent opportunity for political influence in JNC
operations is not the only threat to judicial independence.  The
governor’s influence regarding judicial appointments also plays
a significant role in maintaining politics in the judiciary.78 For
instance, the governor can politically control a JNC by
appointing someone based upon personal friendship or politi-
cal relationship.79 More
importantly, the governor’s
JNC appointees could then
influence the other three
lawyers when determining the
remaining three lay members.
Thus, the governor could
arguably control the list of
judicial nominees because of
his or her dominating influ-
ence over the commission.80
Advocates for merit selection concede that merit selection is
not perfect, but contend that it preserves judicial indepen-
dence because political influence is minimized.  However, any
amount of political influence can threaten judicial indepen-
dence.  Even the appearance of political abuse or manipulation
can promote public distrust of lawyers and the entire judicial
system.  The fact that merit selection has already existed in
Florida for over twenty years does not exemplify success.
Merit selection is not perfect, but its flaws can be corrected.
MERIT RETENTION
Merit retention is a form of the elective system where voters
decide whether to retain the incumbent judge by casting a sim-
ple “yes” or “no” vote on ballots within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of their court.81 If the judge obtains more affirmative votes,
then he or she is retained for another term of judgeship.82
Thereafter, the trial judge would stand for review every six
years.83 However, if the judge receives more negative votes, their
judgeship is deemed vacant and is subsequently filled through
the merit selection process.84 Although merit retention is
thought to provide a democratic balance to the merit selection
process, it resurrects  the problems  inherent in judicial elec-
tions.85 To fully understand this reasoning, we must first discuss
the arguments regarding the election method.
The Election Method
In the November 2000 general election, Florida citizens
voted to continue selecting their trial judges in their respective
communities by popular nonpartisan elections.86 Advocates
for judicial elections contend that this method of judicial selec-
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private benefit of himself or members of his family.
FLA. STAT.§ 106.08(1) (1987), provided in pertinent part:
(1) No person, political committee, or committee of
continuous existence shall make contributions to any can-
didate or political committee in this state, for any election,
in excess of the following amounts:
(e) To a candidate for county court or
circuit court judge, $1000.
(f) To a candidate for retention as a
tion preserves the democratic
process and ensures direct
accountability to the public.87
However, opponents of the
election method stress that
judges are different in that
their position does not
require accountability like
that of legislative and execu-
tive officials.88 Furthermore,
judicial elections require cam-
paign contributions, which
threaten judicial indepen-
dence.89 Although popular
elections provide a more democratic means of judicial selec-
tion, the judiciary is a unique branch of government where
legal ethics—instead of politics—govern judicial behavior.
The main argument against judicial elections for which
there appears to be no resolution is the issue of judicial cam-
paign contributions.90 Like all elections for public office, judi-
cial elections cost money, and the expense necessary to run a
judicial campaign is substantially high.91 Although some judi-
cial candidates are able to finance their own campaigns, private
financial contributions from lawyers, law firms, and special
interest groups are the norm.92 Consequently, judicial inde-
pendence, impartiality, and ethics are compromised, and the
appearance of impropriety becomes apparent.93 This concern
is evidenced in several Florida cases.  
For instance, in Mackenzie v. Breakstone94, the plaintiff ’s
attorney contributed $500 to the trial judge’s husband’s cir-
cuit court campaign, and the defendant moved to disqualify
the trial judge on these grounds.  The trial judge denied the
motion as legally insufficient.  On appeal, the Third District
court held that the $500 contribution by the plaintiff ’s attor-
ney constituted a legally sufficient ground for disqualifica-
tion.95 In MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc.,96 the
defendant also moved to disqualify the same trial judge on
the same grounds as in Breakstone.97 The trial judge stated
that based upon the Third District’s ruling in Breakstone, the
defendant’s motion was legally sufficient for disqualifica-
tion.98 However, the trial judge concluded that since the con-
tributing attorney’s motion for withdrawal was granted, her
recusal from this proceeding was not necessary and ulti-
mately denied the defendant’s motion for disqualification.99
The two cases were then consolidated for purposes of en banc
consideration by the Third District court.100 The district
court determined that the $500 contribution was substantial
enough to cause a reasonable person to fear that they would
not receive a fair trial.101
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court noted that the per-
ception of bias is feasible where a judge receives a campaign
contribution from a litigant or an attorney currently before the
judge.102 However, it concluded that an allegation that a liti-
gant or an attorney made a campaign contribution to the pre-
siding trial judge, or the judge’s spouse, alone was not legally
sufficient to warrant the judge’s disqualification.103
The court’s analysis focused primarily on the statutory limits
and disclosure requirements on campaign contributions in
judicial elections.104 Specifically, the court acknowledged the
judge’s need for campaign contributions and noted that because
most of these contributions come from lawyers, the appearance
of impropriety in the judiciary is of special concern.105 In
response to this concern, statutes and provisions in Florida’s
Code of Judicial Conduct restrained solicitation of campaign
funds, imposed monetary limits on campaign contributions,
and required public disclosure of such contributions.106 The
court believed that although this legislation did  not negate the
existence of a reasonable fear of prejudice, it did virtually elim-
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inate any appearance of impropriety.107 Also, the court feared
that to rule otherwise would result in judicial chaos, where too
many attorneys and judges would be barred from cases due to
campaign contributions.108 However, Justice Kogan and Justice
Overton mentioned changing to a merit retention system in
light of the problems presented in the case.109
Like the majority in Breakstone, election advocates believe
that statutory limits and disclosure requirements would allevi-
ate the problems associated with judicial campaign contribu-
tions from other lawyers.110 For instance, it is believed that
requiring all campaign funding through campaign committees
creates a kind of anonymity that minimizes the appearance of
possible quid pro quo relationships.111 However, other factors
may reveal a contributor’s identity.112 For example, the very
disclosure laws that require candidates to file reports revealing
their campaign contributions would also reveal the contribu-
tors’ names.113 Also, fund-raising events where the candidates
come in direct contact with their supporters and volunteer
workers would easily reveal contributors.114 Thus, funding
through campaign committees would not eliminate the appear-
ance of quid pro quo.
Also, monetary limits on judicial campaign contributions
do not eliminate the appearance of impropriety, because the
problem is not the amount of money contributed, but the act
of contributing itself.115 Although Breakstone held that a con-
tribution from a lawyer alone was legally insufficient to require
disqualification of a judge, the appearance of impropriety still
lingers.116 Mere acceptance of campaign funds, whether
through a committee as required or individually, creates a
financial relationship between the judge and the contributor,
which virtually induces a quid pro quo effect.117 Consequently,
this mere appearance of impropriety diminishes public confi-
dence in judicial impartiality and independence.118
Because campaign contributions are an integral part of
judicial elections, the problems associated with them render
the elective system unsuitable for judicial selection.  The
consequential appearance of impropriety, and the fact that
legal ethics essentially govern the judicial office, prevents
popular elections from being an acceptable method for judi-
cial selection. 
The Merit Retention
Method
Although merit retention
is promoted as the answer
to maintaining democracy
in selecting our judges, it
resurrects the same prob-
lems inherent in judicial
elections.  For instance,
merit retention elections
require citizens to vote
whether to retain the
incumbent judge based
upon “merit,” or his or her
record.  Therefore, retention elections are uncontested by
other judicial candidates.  However, incumbent judges can
still be contested by special interest groups causing campaign
contribution issues to return.  However, adequate education
of the public could minimize potential opposition during
retention elections and, thus, abrogate the need to campaign
and solicit contributions.
The main problem with merit retention elections is the
return of campaign contribution issues.  Currently, pursuant to
merit retention procedures, a judge cannot actively campaign
or raise campaign funds unless faced with active opposition.119
Advocates for merit retention believe that because the incum-
bent is uncontested, campaign contributions become less sig-
nificant.120 However, although retention elections are uncon-
tested by judicial candidates, an incumbent can still be con-
tested by a disgruntled special interest group.121
For instance, in 1990, Florida Supreme Court Justice
Leander Shaw faced strong opposition from Citizens for a
Responsible Judiciary because of an opinion he authored that
struck down a statute requiring parental consent before minors
could obtain an abortion.122 Although a majority of lawyers
and judges believed Justice Shaw was a competent justice, his
retention was still intensely challenged.123 As a result, he was
forced to raise and spend approximately $300,000 on his reten-
tion campaign.124 Ultimately, over 40% of Florida’s citizens
voted to remove Justice Shaw.125
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Also, Florida Supreme Court
Justice Rosemary Barkett faced
strong opposition from several dif-
ferent groups in her 1992 retention
election.  The Citizens for a
Responsible Judiciary, who was the
same group that opposed Justice
Shaw two years earlier, opposed
Justice Barkett’s retention for joining
Justice Shaw’s majority opinion
striking down parental consent for
abortions.126 This group also cam-
paigned that Justice Barkett was “soft on crime” and managed to
get more than half of the state’s law enforcement and state attor-
neys to oppose Justice Barkett’s retention.127 Also, Florida Right
to Life opposed Justice Barkett for her opinion which stated that
permanently incapacitated people who have a living will or the
like are not subject to forced feeding.128 Consequently, Justice
Barkett received one of the lowest bar poll ratings ever given to
a supreme court justice in the history of the bar’s merit-retention
poll.129 As a result, Justice Barkett raised between $270,000 and
$300,000, most of which came from lawyers, to fight her oppo-
sition.130 Her campaign included television commercials and
radio ads, literature, and personal appearances.131 Ultimately,
Justice Barkett was retained with only 60% of the vote.132
These examples demonstrate that incumbent judges in
retention elections are still fair game for opposition.  Once an
incumbent judge’s retention is opposed, the judge must engage
in a costly campaign that is primarily funded with private cam-
paign contributions.  Thus, a change in the merit retention
process is very much needed. 
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE OR ALTERNATIVES
The proposed compromise in the merit selection and reten-
tion method for judicial selection is not perfect.  However,
judicial independence and accountability can coexist with a
few adjustments.  For instance, changing the composition of
JNCs and reforming JNC procedures with regard to judicial
selection will significantly decrease political influence and
improve judicial quality.  Also, adequate education of the
retention process combined with bar polls and judicial evalua-
tions will encourage judicial accountability.  Thus, if the pub-
lic is properly educated and informed, the need for retention
campaigns would be greatly reduced.
Proposed Changes in Merit Selection
As previously noted, one problem with merit selection is the
potential for political influence.  In order to eliminate this
problem, some reform in the merit selection system is
required.  This reform includes changing the composition of
the JNC and implementing laws that would open JNC deliber-
ations to the public and restrict lobbying of JNC members.
First, altering the JNC composition would minimize the
potential for political abuse.  For instance, change the number
of JNC members from nine to seven.  The three Florida Bar
appointments and three lay-member positions would remain.
However, the third set of gubernatorial appointments would be
replaced with one member from the Judicial Qualifications
Commission (JQC).133 Each of the thirteen JQC members
would serve on two of the twenty-six JNCs.  Since the purpose
of the JQC is to investigate judges and justices for alleged judi-
cial misconduct during their term of office, it seems logical
that a JQC member participate in judicial selection.134
Moreover, removing the governor’s participation in the JNC
membership and adding a JQC member to the mix would
essentially decrease political influence and increase the focus
on quality.135
The governor should not be completely removed from the
judicial selection picture.  The new seven-member JNC would
still provide a list of three to six nominees for judgeship to the
governor for appointment.  To maintain accountability, the
governor’s appointment would be confirmed by the Senate.
This would provide the necessary “check” on the governor’s
judicial appointments.
Additionally, because the JNC membership will be reduced
from nine to seven, each JNC should be funded in an amount
sufficient to retain two full-time investigators to assist in back-
ground checks, interview preparation, and general reviews on
candidates’ qualifications.136 These investigators would come
from the private sector and would be chosen by a majority vote
of the JNC membership.  Also, with regard to diversity in JNC
membership, section 43.29 and the uniform rules of JNC pro-
cedure would still encourage the appointment of minorities to
serve on JNCs.
Another remedy that would virtually eliminate political
influence is to open JNC deliberations to the public and main-
tain a public record of the vote.  Currently, the uniform rules
of JNC procedure prohibit open deliberations and do not
require recording of the votes.137 Also, legislative efforts in
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both houses to open JNC deliberations have failed.138 Allowing
the public to view deliberations would ensure that politics and
prejudices are not playing a role in the final selection.  More
importantly, if the final selection is challenged, the voting
process would be documented for review.139 Thus, JNC delib-
erations should be made open to the public to eliminate the
potential for wrongdoing.
Finally, another solution for removing politics is to implement
a law severely limiting contact between candidates, or their sup-
porters, and JNC members.  Recently, JNC members discussed
developing an advisory letter informing applicants of what con-
stitutes appropriate contact with JNC members.140 However,
such a mandate would be more effective if it were implemented
as part of the uniform rules of JNC procedure or as a provision
under § 43.29 of the Florida Statutes.  Specifically, this mandate
would permit a JNC to publicly announce a time period in which
it could receive information on the judicial candidates.  Once the
specified time period has expired, any contact regarding the can-
didates would be deemed unlawful lobbying.  This may result in
disciplinary measures or penalties for the respective candidate.
Furthermore, this mandate would require JNC members to
immediately disclose any contacts received after the specified
time period from either the candidates or their supporters,141 or
they too may be subject to discipline.  Establishing a rule or law
limiting lobbying efforts would curb the appearance of political
influence while allowing for public participation.
These proposed solutions to the concern of potential politi-
cal influence in the merit selection process virtually eliminate
politics while maintaining the delicate balance between judicial
independence and accountability.
Proposed Changes in Merit Retention
The core problem with merit retention is not so much the
return of campaign funding issues as it is the lack of informa-
tion to assist the average voter.  In fact, the proposed solutions
for improving the publication of merit retention information
may help resolve the issues associated with retention cam-
paign funding.
First, the electorate must be edu-
cated on the merit retention
process.  Studies have showed that
a majority of Florida voters are con-
fused about the retention
process.142 However, in order for
the public to appreciate merit reten-
tion, the public must first under-
stand the fundamentals of the judi-
ciary.143 Specifically, the public
should understand the importance
of a judge’s impartiality in decisions based on the rule of law144
and the distinct functions of the trial and appellate courts.
Then local newspapers and the Florida Bar should join forces
to educate the public on how the merit retention system works
and what the expectations are from the electorate.145 Once the
public understands the merit retention process, then it should
be provided with adequate information regarding a judge’s
record in order to assess judicial performance when determin-
ing a judge’s retention.  This could be accomplished by com-
bining bar ratings with sufficient information from an inde-
pendent source.
For instance, in 1988, Colorado established performance
evaluation commissions.  These commissions, composed of
lawyers and lay persons, assess judicial performance and pro-
vide information to both the public and the judges being eval-
uated.146 Specifically, the commissions distribute question-
naires to court personnel, law enforcement officers, jurors, and
other people who regularly converse with the courts.147
Commission members also personally interview the judges
and observe them in the courtroom.148 Upon completion of
their evaluations, the commissions educate the public and
inform the judges who have been evaluated with the results.149
This method of judicial evaluation, which employs citizen par-
ticipation, was deemed a success and became part of Colorado
law.150 Incidentally, this program was formed on the belief that
public interest in retention elections would increase if the pub-
lic was involved in the evaluation process.151
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Another suggestion
would be to expand the
Florida Bar’s Judicial
Evaluation Committee’s cur-
rent judicial evaluation pro-
gram.  This committee pri-
marily monitors the perfor-
mance of all judges,
whether sitting or up for
retention, by distributing
secret ballots to attorneys
statewide.152 The results are
shared with the judges who participate in the program and the
public.153 However, this program could be expanded to include
more extensive evaluations of those judges seeking retention.
Like Colorado’s citizen-based commissions, the bar’s Judicial
Evaluation Committee could conduct similar detailed evalua-
tions of the judges up for retention and publish the results.
This evaluation, coupled with bar poll ratings, may be more
effective when informing the public on judicial performance.
Additionally, recommendations from the Judicial
Qualifications Commission would significantly increase the
credibility of information on judicial performance.  Currently,
the JQC is only charged with investigating judges for alleged
misconduct.154 However, a constitutional amendment broad-
ening the JQC’s authority to include evaluations of judges who
are seeking retention would be very beneficial.155 Thus, com-
bined information on judicial performance produced from the
Florida Bar poll ratings, reports from an evaluation commis-
sion (whether citizen based or a bar subcommittee), and the
JQC may prove very effective in providing the necessary assis-
tance to average voters so they could better review the record
of a judge who is seeking retention.
Moreover, candid information on judicial performance from
these sources may curb the need to campaign against opposi-
tion because the record will sufficiently speak for itself.  In the
event a judge’s retention is opposed, the news media should
permit the judge to publicly respond, and the response should
be limited to an explanation of the legal reasoning or principle
exercised in the case at issue.156 More importantly, in the event
a judge’s record is unjustly criticized, the local bar association
should assist in “setting the record straight.”157 Naturally, the
public is best served if these responses were published in news-
papers that are widely circulated, and not just in legal publica-
tions.158 Thus, providing explicit information on judicial per-
formance coupled with limiting the mode of response to oppo-
sition may essentially abrogate the need for retention election
campaigning and fund raising.
The success of merit retention depends on properly educat-
ing the public on the merit retention system and adequately
conveying to the public effective and sufficient information
regarding the judges’ records.159 Also, setting boundaries for a
judge’s response to opposition may alleviate the need for cam-
paigning and fund raising.  Thus, these proposed solutions vir-
tually eliminate the potential appearance of impropriety asso-
ciated with judicial campaigns while maintaining democratic
participation.
CONCLUSION
A majority of Florida voters have decided to continue elect-
ing their trial judges and preserve a democratic means for
choosing judges that only judicial elections can provide.
However, the inherent need for campaign contributions ren-
ders the elective system unsuitable for judicial selection.
Furthermore, the various statutory provisions and ethical
codes on campaign practices do not eliminate the appearance
of impropriety entirely.  The merit system was promoted as the
great compromise between the democratic accountability pro-
vided in popular elections and the essential judicial indepen-
dence provided in direct appointments.  Although this com-
promise appears viable, the same political influence that per-
meated direct appointment and the same campaign issues that
plagued popular elections are revisited.
For merit selection and retention to truly be a great com-
promise, modifications must be made in both systems.  The
proposed changes in JNC composition and procedures would
ensure more judicial independence and quality.  Also, provid-
ing useful information regarding a judge’s record from credible
sources would essentially alleviate the need for zealous cam-
paigning for retention.  The fact that the merit system has
already been in existence in Florida for over twenty years does
not denote success.  These changes should be considered and
implemented now if advocates want voters to extend the merit
system to the selection of trial court judges.  
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The judicial decision-making process is not one for whichresolution arises from counting, measuring, or weighing.Rather, the courtroom is a field for debate about the inter-
pretation and application of values as embodied in or reflected
by the law.  Decisions reached in court are judgments and not
mathematical conclusions in that the inherently contestable
nature of the issues at stake precludes an outcome that is self-
evident to all.  As such, although there is an element of fact-
finding that emerges in a judicial opinion, there is also always
a subjective valuation of the principles at stake; to draw on
Socrates, there is always an assessment “of what is just and
unjust, honourable and dishonourable, good and bad.”  Most
often, the process of judicial decision making involves an
intermediate process in which fact-finding and subjective eval-
uative efforts intermingle and end up informing one another.
So the judicial decision is both explanatory and explorative,
revealing facts and drawing principled conclusions that tell a
story about what is just and why it is so.  In this way, the judi-
cial opinion straddles the worlds of science and fiction—con-
cerned as it is with uncovering facts, but always normatively
concerned with the story that emerges.  
These qualities make the judicial opinion, the product of
this ambivalent hermeneutic, an extremely complex literary
genre.   The difficulties arise not only from the disparate
processes of fact-finding and value judgment, but from the var-
ious functions that a judicial opinion serves once it has been
rendered.  There is the immediate conflict between or among
litigants that the courts must resolve.  It is necessary for the
court to arbitrate the discrete matter of concern to the parties
involved.  But the judicial text is also a synthesizer.  It filters
the body of existing law into a series of well-defined proposi-
tions that are then applied to the case at bar.  These proposi-
tions are then looked to and interrogated in subsequent cases.
As such, each judgment assumes a place within the jurispru-
dence and stands as precedent for future decisions.
Throughout each of these functions, the judicial opinion car-
ries out a symbolic role as well.  The judgment must stand as
an example of the proper functioning of the justice system and,
in so doing, reflect the health and vigour of the process.  A
given judgment must persuade a reader both that a fair resolu-
tion has been effected and that the decision is a correct appli-
cation of the rule of law.  Thus, the judicial opinion is not just
a reflection of an opinion and a representation of authority, but
also a device that must persuade while maintaining the legiti-
macy of the legal system.
An additional challenge emerges when the court decides that
there must be a change in the law.  To this list of disparate pur-
poses is added a further persuasive need—the judgment must
demonstrate why what was once good or true or just (or,
indeed, lawful) is no longer adequate.  It is at these turning
points in the law that the rhetorical nature of judgments
becomes most apparent.  While there is always an element of
persuasion and argument in the judicial opinion, it is at these
moments of change that the need for effective language is most
exigent.  I will argue that a critical component of the judge’s lin-
guistic toolbox is metaphor and that this device is most neces-
sary and effective at these turning points in the law.  A
metaphor has the ability to bridge the abstract and the concrete,
using elements of similarity to effect a seemingly natural appeal
to common sense, and to mold the future development of
jurisprudence.  This critical role for the metaphor in legal judg-
ments emerges from a consideration of the structure and func-
tions of a judicial opinion and the complementary functions of
metaphor. This relationship between the judicial decision and
metaphor is confirmed by an examination of key metaphors in
the development of Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence.
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Trial by Metaphor:
Rhetoric, Innovation, and the Juridical Text
Benjamin L. Berger
Socrates: Let’s look at it this way.  If we differed, you and I, about which of two things was more
numerous, would our difference on these questions make us angry and hostile towards one another?
Or would we resort to counting in such disputes and soon be rid of them?
Euthyphro: We certainly would.
Socrates: Again, if we differed about which was larger and smaller, we’d soon put an end to our dif-
ference by resorting to measurement, wouldn’t we?
Euthyphro: That’s right.
Socrates: And we would decide a dispute about which was heavier and lighter, presumably, by resort-
ing to weighing. 
Euthyphro: Of course.
Socrates: Then what sorts of questions would make us angry and hostile towards one another, if we
differed about them and were unable to reach a decision?  Perhaps you can’t say offhand.  But con-
sider my suggestion, that they are questions of what is just and unjust, honourable and dishon-
ourable, good and bad… 
Plato’s Euthyphro, 7b-d.
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THE JUDICIAL OPINION
The Canadian judicial opinion assumes an organized form
and structure.  This particular form becomes a kind of tem-
plate for decisions to which legal professionals become accus-
tomed.  Although there can be variance among the precise
structures adopted by a particular judge, there is nevertheless
a common form that can be discerned.  This form is the means
by which the content of legal decisions is communicated to
and, subsequently, understood by the community, broadly
defined.  As such, this structure is not just an organizational
form, but is the locus for community debate on the topic at
hand as well as the paradigm of legal reasoning that configures
the ensuing conversation.  The conventional form of the deci-
sion constitutes a structuring of legal knowledge and thought
in a communicative social document and, as such, can be
understood as the foundation for a legal rhetoric.  J. B. White
recognizes that this rhetorical character has implications for
the social and cultural functions of law:
...[T]he fact that the law can be understood as a
comprehensibly organized method of argument, or
what I call a rhetoric, means that it is at once a social
activity—a way of acting with others—and a cul-
tural activity—a way of acting with a certain set of
materials found in the culture.  It is always commu-
nal, both in the sense that it always takes place in a
social context and in the sense that it is always con-
stitutive of the community by which it works.1
Canadian judgments generally begin with a statement of the
facts of the case.  The conflict, crime, or dispute is described in
a sort of narrative that is ultimately aimed at delineating the
main issue at trial or on appeal.  A distilled statement of the
critical legal point in question generally follows this narrative.
This final section sets the scene for the legal argumentation
that will follow.
The next portion of the judgment characteristically consists
of the history of the case.  An appellate court will recount the
arguments and reasoning offered in the lower courts and
describe the manner in which the law and facts were inter-
preted at these stages.  Next, the court sets out what it sees to
be the relevant law used to decide the issue under considera-
tion.  This description will likely include a presentation of rel-
evant statute law and a survey of the case law, both of which
will inform the reasoning of the court.  Essentially, this process
is the assemblage of all sources of authority that the judge or
judges will have to consider while coming to a decision.  Often,
the judgment will include excerpts from past decisions and will
extract what the court understands to be the critical principles
that will affect the judges’ determination in the case.  At this
point, the judicial opinion has laid out the facts, the history of
the case, and the critical law.  The essential component of the
decision follows, in which the court turns its attention to the
application of the law to the facts.
Here the judgment crystallizes
and the court draws its final con-
clusions as to the appropriate dis-
position of the case in light of the
applicable principles of law.
This structure, briefly out-
lined, demonstrates that the judi-
cial opinion involves a series of
tasks.  A judgment must success-
fully delineate facts, canvass
legal history, assemble and assess
the applicable law, and arrive at
an appropriate conclusion.  From this constellation of tasks,
one can discern a number of purposes for the judgment.
Importantly, it is not the purpose of the judicial opinion to act
as a means of reaching a decision.  Rather, once the opinion is
written, “the judge’s intellectual effort has already been
achieved, his deliberation finished, and there remains only the
question of form.”2 Indeed, C. Perelman argues that “the
important thing is not the passage from premises to conclusion
but the way the judge justifies his premises both in fact and
law.”3 This process of justification is achieved by accomplish-
ing three objectives.  First, the judgment must maintain the
authority and integrity of the legal process.  Second, the opin-
ion must attract authority for the discrete point of law that the
court has decided.  Finally, and particularly in cases where the
court departs from established law, the decision must persuade
the reader that justice has been carried out. 
The authority of the judicial system substantially depends
upon the appearance that it has conformed to the rule of law.
The rule of law demands, among other things, that decisions
are reached through a reasonable and transparent process.  The
law must not appear capricious or arbitrary in the deployment
of its power.  As well, the courts must apply the duly consti-
tuted laws of the country as enacted by the democratic legisla-
ture.  “The older (primarily Judaic and Christian) tradition saw
the law as a set of authoritative commands, entitled to respect
partly from their antiquity, partly from their concordance with
the law of nature and of God.”4 To the extent that these
sources are no longer regarded as the fount of authority in a
modern liberal state, the judicial opinion must garner its legit-
imacy from the reasoned manner of its application.  By con-
forming to the due process of law, including both transparent
and equitable reasoning as well as the application of the legit-
imate laws of the nation, the judicial opinion asserts the legit-
imacy of the processes of justice and, in so doing, argues for its
own authority.
The judgment also asserts the legitimacy of the law to which
it appeals.  The courts operate on the principle of stare decisis,
which dictates that previous decisions made on a similar topic
ought to be binding on subsequent courts.  This doctrine, also
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known as the doctrine of
“precedent,” ensures a
degree of predictability and
transparency to the applica-
tion of law.  The past history
of the common law affects
the manner in which pre-
sent issues of law should be
decided; indeed, the use of
precedent “is the invocation
of the authority of prior
texts to shape and constrain what should be done in the pre-
sent.”5 This principle provides the law with a legitimacy
derived from the history and collective experience of the law.
James Boyd White imagines what a system without judicial
opinion would be like:
One’s first reaction might be to think that in such
a system there would be no precedent, no argument
from precedent, and in this sense no law: every
question would be argued as an original matter,
without the advantage of the collective experience
over time that the judicial opinion provides.  We
would be deprived of a crucial method of learning
from the past, indeed, of a way of making ourselves
over time.6
When a judicial opinion appeals to past law, it at once jus-
tifies the interpretation that the court is about to adopt and
affirms the weight and significance of the principle of stare
decisis.  It is for this reason that some have commented that “a
judicial system relying on precedents requires by its very
nature citation from prior opinions. . . .”7 Through the use of
precedent the writer is able to claim authority for the law itself.
In addition, the affirmation of stare decisis in a judgment
ensures that it, too, may be relied upon in the future for its
own precedential value. The effect of precedent is to affirm
past law, legitimize present rulings, and to mold the future
development of the law.  As such, each decision has a circular
authoritative effect or “self-legitimizing” nature in addition to
a prospective impact.
Both of these functions (ascribing authority to the justice
system and to the law itself) rely on an element of persuasion
in judicial opinions.  Judges face a number of persuasive tasks.
They must convince the reader that the system has operated
properly, that the law is itself legitimate, and that the court has
arrived at a just resolution as between the litigants.  This per-
suasion requires the judge to use language in a rather literary
fashion: “without persuasion, law could not be law, and with-
out fiction, there would be no persuasion.”8 The judge is effec-
tively constructing a “story” of the case—a story that will be
more or less convincing, commensurate with the consistency
and coherence of its internal structure and arguments.  Again,
the social nature of the judicial opinion emerges from an appre-
ciation of its persuasive elements.  A judgment is written with
an audience, or audiences, in mind and it is the child of the
legal system, which is itself a cultural institution.  So while a
judicial decision is always invested with certain inertia toward
clarity, the argumentative nature of the text invests it with an
element of uncertainty—will the argument be successful, will
the reader be persuaded?  As P. Goodrich observes,
While the law is undoubtedly invested with a
peculiarly “concrete” force or function, its argumen-
tative method and justificatory rhetoric encode a
relation to the social in a manner that can never be
either verified or falsified.9
But an additional persuasive burden is imposed when the
court decides that the law should change or be reconceptual-
ized.  Suddenly, the court must justify its departure from the
weight of precedent but must not, in the process, throw into
question the legitimacy of law or the justice system.  To meet
this task, all tools in the judge’s linguistic toolbox must be
employed.  The balance of this paper will argue that recourse
to metaphor is an essential technique used in judicial opinion
to discharge the judge’s persuasive burden and that metaphor
is particularly used where the court sets out to alter the law.
THE METAPHOR
The metaphor has attracted the concerted and sus-
tained attention of philosophers, philologists, linguists,
rhetoriticians, and semioticians for much of written history.
This seemingly simple linguistic trope has proven to be a
touchstone for intense debate regarding the nature of language
and of thought.  With Nietzsche, the metaphor became a mod-
ern philosophical problem of language that has carried forth
into 20th century.  The structuralists, represented by Jakobson,
Saussure, and Barthes, forwarded a theory of metaphor that
focused on the semiotics of language and thought.  The mass
of literature that has accreted around the concept of metaphor
is complex and intriguing.  However, for the purposes of this
analysis, the starting point for understanding the basic func-
tioning of metaphor is Aristotle:
Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that
belongs to something else; the transference being
either from genus to species, or from species to
genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of
analogy.10
At core, the metaphor is a linguistic means of drawing
together two objects, items, or concepts.  The metaphor “des-
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ignates a verbal/symbolic
relationship (usually based
upon similarity) between two
concepts or images which
mutually describe or enhance
each other.”11 This concep-
tual relationship consists of
describing one thing with ref-
erence to another, thereby
linking particular features of
the two.  As such, metaphor
is “both a peculiar or aberrant
form of naming things and is
also a potentially logical act of predication attributing a resem-
blance. . . .”12
But this tension between peculiarity and logic is precisely
what affords the metaphor its rhetorical force.  The semblance
of absurd equivalence is followed by a realization of similarity
and this conceptual progression effects a number of purposes,
particularly when the metaphor is used to communicate or
interpret an abstract idea.  First, when a metaphor is used to
describe a concept in terms of a familiar object, the realm of
the abstract and the concrete are bridged.  Second, to the
extent that the metaphor refers to the qualities of this everyday
object, this trope makes an appeal to “common sense.”  Finally,
once established, the ultimate logic of the equivalence drawn
can have the effect of shaping the manner in which the abstract
concept is ultimately understood.  These selected functions of
metaphor have particular resonance in legal discourse.  Each
serves a function in communicating legal reasoning and gain-
ing authority for judicial decisions.  
The metaphor is particularly apt as a means of explaining
complex or abstract ideas.  By drawing the idea together with
a familiar item or phenomenon, the metaphor provides a con-
ceptual bridge for the reader to follow:
The metaphor provides the “abstract,” imageless
thought with an intuition drawn from the world of
appearances whose function is ‘to establish the real-
ity of our concepts’ and thus undo, as it were, the
withdrawal from the world of appearances that is
the precondition of mental activities.13
The metaphor is the vehicle that carries the reader from a
world of common objects, and their attendant qualities, to the
realm of ideas.  By effecting this link, the metaphor acts to
“guarantee the unity of human experience”14 in that even the
most conceptual and theoretical ideas find explication through
analogy to common phenomena.  The metaphor is the agent by
which a reader is invited to understand a complex idea by
assigning to it qualities found in a familiar or simple object.
Legal thought often operates in the realm of the abstract and
complex.  Indeed, law has its own language of specialized and
artificial terms assigned meanings particular to the legal world.
These terms are functional and instructive in the legal realm
and for the purposes of analysis, but when the courts must pre-
sent their findings to the public, these abstract constructions
will not suffice.  Perelman recognizes this use of metaphor aris-
ing from the need for communication:
From artificial languages are excluded vagueness,
imprecisions and analogic and metaphoric uses of
notions. . . .As soon as the strict rules imposed arti-
ficially by language yield to the hermeneutic
requirement, the same words will no longer have the
same meaning; a significance given in one context
can no longer be valid in all others; the use of anal-
ogy and metaphor can no longer be denied, but, on
the contrary, imposed by the desire for communica-
tion and comprehension.15
Thus, while for the purpose of analysis the courts can refer
to the constitutional division of power by use of special terms
such as “interjurisdictional immunity,” “paramountcy,” and
“double aspect fields,” they consistently resort to the term
“watertight compartments” to convey the strict segregation of
provincial and federal powers.  The metaphor carries with it an
explicative power that inheres in its ability to bridge the con-
crete and conceptual worlds.  As such, the metaphor acts as
more than a mere linguistic flourish or stylistic embellishment
—it is a mode of thought that concretizes and, in so doing,
communicates abstract or peculiar concepts.  Thus, “through
incorporation of tropes into legal opinions, what is abstruse
and obscure becomes concrete and comprehensible.”16
Attendant upon this communicative clarity is the ability of
the metaphor to make an appeal to common sense.  Through
the equation of the abstract with the everyday, what is alien
and novel is rendered familiar and, in some sense, obvious.  H.
Arendt reflects that
The simple fact that our mind is able to fund such
analogies, that the world of appearances reminds us
of things non-apparent, may be seen as a kind of
“proof” that mind and body, thinking and sense
experience, the invisible and the visible, belong
together, are “made” for each other, as it were.17
Once the reader accepts the equivalence or “link” between
the abstract concept and the everyday, the implications of these
common qualities become apparent.  A set of “obvious” infer-
ences flows from the familiar characteristics highlighted by the
metaphor. For example, the notion that love is precious or
must be treated with care is self-evident—common sense—
once it is accepted that “love is like a rose.”  As Lakoff and
Johnson note: 
Because so many of the concepts that are impor-
tant to us are either abstract or not clearly delin-
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eated in our experience (the emotions, ideas, time,
etc.), we need to get a grasp on them by means of
other concepts that we understand in clearer terms
(spatial orientations, objects, etc.).18
This appeal to common sense is of critical importance to the
juridical metaphor.  If the court is arguing that a particular idea
must be interpreted in some fashion and can draw a metaphor-
ical link to an analogous situation in common experience, arti-
ficial judicial reasoning can appear to be simple common sense.
Returning to the division of powers example, a court arguing
that legislative powers must be tightly constrained within par-
ticular bounds makes an apt analogy to the “watertight com-
partment.”  If legislative powers are “watertight compartments,”
then it is common sense, or obvious, that there should be no
overflow between powers.  Thus, legal discourse can use the
metaphor to afford the legitimacy of common sense to its own
reasoning.  This use of the metaphor is apropos, given that cases
arise from common experience and the principles arising from
judicial opinion must, ultimately, be used in common experi-
ence: “since the story both begins and ends in ordinary language
and experience, the heart of the law is the process of translation
by which it must work, from ordinary language to legal lan-
guage and back again.”19
Finally, the metaphor functions to shape subsequent thought
about the concept that it modifies.  Any metaphor emphasizes
certain qualities while hiding others, thereby focusing subse-
quent attention on only those common features upon which it
depends.  This is particularly true where a “fresh” metaphor is
introduced because this newly revealed relationship is immedi-
ately defined in terms of the qualities that its creator has
stressed.
New metaphors, like conventional metaphors,
can have the power to define reality.  They do this
through a coherent network of entailments that
highlight some features of reality and hide others.
The acceptance of the metaphor, which forces us to
focus only on those aspects of our experience that it
highlights, leads us to view the entailments of the
metaphor as being true.  Such “truths” may be true,
of course, only relative to the reality defined by the
metaphor.20
Once the relationship is accepted, future discussion about the
abstract element of the metaphor is shaped, limited, and con-
strained by the conceptual definition that the trope has created.
Consider the spatial metaphors associated with the concept of
“control.”  Control is associated with the spatial concept “up” as
in “I have control over him.”  Once this association is accepted,
the tendency is for this formative relationship to guide future
conceptualizations of control: “he is under my power,” “I’m on
top of the situation,” “I have
it under control,” etc.  This
pattern does not preclude
other constructions of the
concept, but the metaphori-
cal association between
“control” and “up” is a very
powerful one.
The same dynamic takes
place when metaphors are
used in legal opinions.
Once a legal concept is
imbued with the “spark of imagination”21 of metaphor, this lin-
guistic relationship exerts a substantial coercive and constrain-
ing effect on future thought about the law.  Certain aspects of
legal problems are drawn out by metaphors and subsequent
thought focuses upon these highlighted characteristics.  As
such, the use of metaphor in judicial decision making is a
means for the court to extend its approach to a legal principle
or concept beyond the particular case by fixing upon particular
dimensions or qualities of the law in question.  These
metaphorically centralized qualities become the lens through
which the problem is seen in the future while other dimensions
of the problem not captured by the metaphor fade into the
rhetorical background.  This constraining effect is heightened
by virtue of the principle of stare decisis (itself a metaphor—to
“stand” by a decision), discussed earlier.  The doctrine of prece-
dent and the very language employed by the judge combine to
create metaphorical limits upon judicial reasoning.
Ultimately, each of these uses of metaphor in judicial opin-
ions contributes to the overall project of a set of judicial rea-
sons—to persuade.  For the law to retain its legitimacy, its audi-
ences must be convinced that legal institutions are arriving at
just and appropriate conclusions.  Robert Gordon comments as
follows:
. . .[T]he power exerted by a legal regime consists
less in the force that it can bring to bear against vio-
lators of its rules than in its capacity to persuade
people that the world described in its images and
categories is the only attainable world in which a
sane person would want to live.22
This need to persuade is heightened where the courts
attempt to make a substantial change in the law.  In these cases,
the judicial opinion must convince the reader that the just res-
olution to a case requires a departure from the weight of his-
torical interpretation as well as a reformation of the way in
which the law ought to deal with a given issue.  To the extent
that it is able to render the complex simple, appeal to common
sense, and structure thinking about a particular issue, the
metaphor can be seen as a powerful tool to be used in this task
18. G. LAKOFF, et al., METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 115 (Univ. of Chicago
Press 1980).
19. Supra note 1, at 692.
20. Supra note 18, at 157-8.
21. P. RICOEUR, THE RULE OF METAPHOR: MULTI-DISCIPLINARY STUDIES OF
THE CREATION OF MEANING IN LANGUAGE 303 (Robert Czerny trans.
Univ. of Toronto Press 2001).
22. R. W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 109
(1984).
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of persuasion.  The final
section of this paper will
offer three examples of
instances in Anglo-
Canadian jurisprudence in
which metaphor was used
in the manner outlined
above to justify a funda-
mental change in the law.
THE LIVING TREE AND
THE GOLDEN THREAD
A n g l o - C a n a d i a n
jurisprudence is replete
with metaphorical con-
structions of the law: estop-
pel is a “shield, not a sword;” judges fear that their decisions
will have a “chilling effect” on commerce or will open the
“floodgates” to litigation; some arguments are mere “side-
winds” while others are “foundations” of the law; and for the
purposes of freedom of speech analyses, society is a “market-
place of ideas.”  As argued above, these figurative devices are
not merely ornamental additions to judicial opinions but,
rather, are rhetorical tools used to preserve and enhance the
legitimacy of the law through their persuasive power.  Two
examples will focus this argument on particular instances in
the history of Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence when the
metaphor was used to argue for a significant change in the law.
First, in the Edwards23 case, which established that the legal
term “persons” includes women, the Canadian Constitution
was called a “living tree.”  Secondly, the presumption of inno-
cence was called the “golden thread” of the criminal law when,
in R. v. Woolmington,24 the court asserted that the Crown must
prove the guilt of an alleged murderer beyond a reasonable
doubt.  
Also called the “Persons Case,” Edwards, an appeal to the
English Privy Council from the Supreme Court of Canada, was
a landmark case for first-wave feminism.  The appellants
argued that s. 24 of the British North America Act, 1867,
Canada’s constitution at the time, should be interpreted so as to
allow women to hold office as a senator.  The Supreme Court
of Canada had earlier concluded that the drafters of s. 24 did
not intend to include women as “persons” eligible to serve as
senators.  As such, the Supreme Court felt constrained to inter-
pret this section in an exclusionary manner.  The English Privy
Council agreed that this was likely the intent of the drafters.
However, the English court also remarked that “customs are apt
to develop into traditions which are stronger than law and
remain unchallenged long after the reason for them has disap-
peared.”25 On this basis, the Law Lords argued that the
Canadian law should adapt to changing social values and that
women should be eligible to act as senators.  In coming to this
conclusion, the court famously declared the following:  “The
British North America Act planted in Canada a living tree capa-
ble of growth and expansion within its natural limits.”26
This decision was controversial and bold.  Yet by using this
metaphor of the Constitution as a “living tree,” the court
achieved a number of important persuasive effects.  First, it
reduced a complex and abstract discussion about the rules of
statutory interpretation to a simple, common symbol—everyone
can conceive of a tree and the natural properties that it possesses.
Secondly, the court appealed to common sense—if, indeed, the
Constitution is a living tree, it naturally follows that it must
grow and change.  Finally, the court shaped future thought about
the way in which the Canadian Constitution should be inter-
preted.  As a document whose very nature involves growth and
transformation, this metaphor suggests that judicial interpreta-
tion of the Constitution should allow for change. 
Although, once accepted, there are a series of common-sense
propositions that follow from this metaphor, note that there is
nothing self-evident about the association itself.  Indeed, the
Privy Council could just as easily have argued that the BNA Act
is a non-animate rock, set down in writing and not to be
reshaped, only to be discarded and replaced.  But by seizing
upon certain characteristics of the written document—namely,
its adaptability and capacity for change—the Privy Council
affected the future development of Canadian constitutional
jurisprudence.  Since 1930, Canadian courts have consistently
returned to this metaphor when describing the Constitution and
arguing that it should adapt to changing social circumstance.
Decided in 1935, Woolmington remains a starting point for
the analysis of Anglo-Canadian criminal law.  It is read in first-
year criminal law courses to teach students the fundamental
concept that an accused is presumed innocent until proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  Yet, when decided, there was
nothing self-evident about this assertion of principle.  Rather,
many held fast to the notion that once the Crown proved that
the deceased died at the hands of the accused, it was the
accused’s responsibility to rebut the presumption that he pos-
sessed the intent to kill.  At trial, the judge in Woolmington
charged the jury in the following way: 
In every charge of murder, the fact of killing
being first proved, all the circumstances of accident,
necessity, or infirmity are to be satisfactorily proved
by the prisoner, unless they arise out of the evidence
produced against him: for the law will presume the
fact to have been founded in malice until the con-
trary appeareth.27
But, having surveyed the English criminal law, the House of
Lords reversed the decision of the trial judge and asserted a new
fundamental principle:
Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law
one golden thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty
of the prosecution to prove the prisoner’s guilt. . . .  If,
at the end of and on the whole of the case, there is a
reasonable doubt, created by the evidence given by
either the prosecution or the prisoner, as to whether
23. Edwards v. A.G. Canada, [1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.) (appeal taken
from Canada).
24. Woolmington v. D.P.P., [1935] A.C. 462 (H.L.).
25. Edwards, A.C. 124 (P.C.) at 134.
26. Id. at 136.
27. Woolmington, A.C. 462 (H.L.), at 472.
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the prisoner killed the deceased with a malicious
intention, the prosecution has not made out the case
and the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal.28
The impact of this declaration cannot be overestimated.
Modern Canadian jurisprudence has remained faithful to this
notion and the presumption of innocence is now considered a
hallmark of trial fairness.
How does one account for the ascendancy of this principle
articulated in Woolmington?  Surely the consonance of the pre-
sumption of innocence with certain principles of natural justice
is somewhat explanatory.  But another aspect of the enthusiastic
adoption of this concept is the persuasiveness with which its
importance was argued.  The court’s choice of metaphor played
no small role in this rhetorical victory.  Once again, this case
demonstrates that the metaphor can bridge the gap between the
abstract and the concrete.  Lord Sankey, the author of this judg-
ment, was able to explain the complex interconnectedness of
principles in the criminal law as well as the central importance
of the presumption of innocence in this system by using the sim-
ple metaphor of a single golden thread within a web.  In this
construction, the “golden thread” is the most valuable element
in the web.  It will not tarnish.  If severed or removed, the beauty
and value, if not the integrity, of the web as a whole would be
diminished.  
Once accepted, this metaphor
leads to the natural, or common-
sense, conclusion that this singu-
lar thread must be protected and
valued above all other tenets of
criminal law.  But additionally,
the invocation of a beautiful and
treasured metal appeals to an
aesthetic and emotional sense in
the reader.  The combined
impact of the metaphor is to
counsel for the careful treatment
of this precious principle.
Indeed, this was precisely the
effect of the judgment.  Future jurisprudence incorporated and
repeated this trope such that, even in modern Canadian crim-
inal jurisprudence, no principle is so fundamental and cher-
ished as the notion that the Crown must prove a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Though both serve similar explicative and rhetorical func-
tions, these two example metaphors do so, in at least one
respect, in very different ways.  The “living tree” metaphor
includes a generative aspect.  That is, the metaphor itself
invokes and invites future thought about the implications of the
image upon the interpretation of that which it embodies.  While
28. Id. at 481 (emphasis added).
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bounded by the limits of the metaphor, debate can continue as
to what precisely it means to say that the Constitution is a “liv-
ing tree.”  In contrast, the metaphor of the “golden thread”
effectively ends the creative-interpretive discussion.   More than
providing boundaries and guiding thought, this image fixes a
single approach to the concept that it explains and concretizes.
This distinction demonstrates that it is not sufficient to recog-
nize simply that legal metaphors shape thought.  The choice of
metaphor—in this case, the choice between one that is genera-
tive and one that is constrictive—can profoundly affect the
manner in which legal thought is affected.
METAPHORS IN JUDICIAL OPINION—CONCLUDING
REMARKS
This article has focused upon the explanatory and persua-
sive powers of the metaphor when used in judicial decision
making.  It is important to recognize, however, that alongside
its positive rhetorical uses, the juridical metaphor also has the
potential to mislead, distort, obscure, and distract.  The
process of simplification can remove complexities that ought
to be explored.  An appeal to common sense, though rhetori-
cally powerful, is open to abuse, particularly where justice and
the majority view diverge.  While seizing upon certain quali-
ties of a particular idea by means of a carefully crafted
metaphor can shape future thinking, it can equally constrain
the fluidity and creativeness of jurisprudential thought.   
As such, the argument advanced in this paper is not a nor-
mative claim as to the desirability of metaphors in judicial
opinion.  Rather, it is an investigation into and reflection of the
rhetorical nature of the judgment—a character in which
metaphor participates.  A judgment is not a declaration of
fact—it is an assertion of the just.  The metaphor is an instru-
ment used in the persuasive project of judicial decision mak-
ing, an undertaking to arbitrate disputes and interpret legal
principles while maintaining and asserting the legitimacy of
the law.
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NEW BOOKS
BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE
LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS.
Random House, 2003.  694 pp.  ($35).
The story of Justice William O. Douglas
has elements of interest to just about any-
one.  Appointed to the U.S. Supreme
Court at age 40, he wrote 1,164 full opin-
ions, including 486 dissents, along with 32
books.  While serving on the Court, he
found time to seek to join Franklin Delano
Roosevelt’s ticket as the candidate for vice
president in 1944, to gain a reputation as a
great outdoorsman (with many of his
books recounting his travels), and to
marry four times, cheating on each of the
first three wives with the woman who
would be next.
As Bruce Allen Murphy demonstrates in
his book, however, Douglas was also some-
thing more—a liar.  And not just to his
wives.  No, Douglas lied about his back-
ground in ways that today would get any
college football coach fired.  He claimed to
have served in the military and was buried
in Arlington National Cemetery.  His mili-
tary service actual consisted only of service
for 10 weeks at the end of World War I in
the Students’ Army Training Corps in
Walla Walla, Washington.  He claimed to
have suffered from polio as a child, but
never had the disease.  He claimed to have
graduated second in his class and to have
just missed out on a clerkship with Justice
Harlan Fiske Stone.  His law school class-
mates, who knew he was neither second in
the class nor a close runner-up for the
clerkship, gave him the moniker “The
Approximate Mr. Justice Douglas” after he
told that tale, with one of them noting that
Douglas was “always a little general about
the facts.”  Murphy shows, through
painstaking research, that Douglas was not
just a little general—he was intentionally
deceptive about matters large and small.
Despite the disclosures of Douglas’ lies
and bad behavior, Murphy is not judg-
mental and presents a balanced biography,
full of detail about events that captivate
interest.  For example, he recounts the cir-
cumstances leading up to Douglas’
issuance, as a single justice, of an order
effectively requiring President Nixon to
halt bombing in Cambodia during the
Vietnam War.  A federal district judge had
ruled that the bombing must stop, but the
Second Circuit had stayed the order and a
congressional end to funding for the
bombing was to take place within two
weeks.  Justice Marshall, the circuit jus-
tice, had already denied a request to set
aside the Second Circuit’s stay order.  But
neither that nor the looming congressional
deadline kept Justice Douglas from agree-
ing—even before Marshall had ruled—to
hear the matter if Marshall refused to lift
the stay.  Douglas scheduled a very public
hearing in the courthouse in his home-
town of Yakima, Washington, then dic-
tated his opinion on a Friday evening to
his entire staff (two secretaries and two
law clerks who were all trying to take it
down together) from a series of pay
phones along the road, fearing govern-
ment wiretaps and some action to thwart
issuance of his decision.  His opinion was
reversed by the full Court a mere six hours
after it was issued.
Murphy’s book has generated many
reviews, with the most interesting perhaps
penned by Judge Richard Posner (and
available online at http://www.law.
uchicago.edu/news/posner-antihero.
html).  Posner notes that he met Douglas
when Douglas was 64 and Posner was a
clerk for Justice William Brennan:
“Douglas struck me as cold and brusque
but charismatic—the most charismatic
judge (well, the only charismatic judge) on
the Court.”  Posner concludes from
Murphy’s evidence that “Douglas turned
out to be a liar to rival Baron Munchausen”
and that Murphy’s book is a “riveting biog-
raphy of one of the most unwholesome fig-
ures in modern American political history.”
If you don’t have time or sufficient interest
to read the full book, a quick read through
Posner’s review will leave you entertained
and provide greater detail of the book than
we have room for here.
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WEBSITES OF INTEREST
National Ad Hoc Advisory Committee
on Judicial Campaign Conduct
http://www.judicialcampaignconduct.org
This website provides information that
would be of interest to judges involved in
elections, as well as others concerned
about the interplay between the election of
judges and judicial independence.
The ad hoc committee was established
by the National Center for State Courts,
but reflects the combined efforts of the
American Judicature Society, the
Constitution Project, the Justice at Stake
Campaign, and a number of individuals
concerned about judicial election issues.
The website brings together a great deal of
material on judicial elections, including
journal articles, court opinions, and even
video clips of TV ads from recent elections.
Self-Help Practitioners’ Resource Center
http://www.selfhelpsupport.org
This website is a new, online resource
center that can help any court in which
there is a desire to provide more effective
assistance to pro se litigants.  The site is
still under construction, but already has a
great deal of valuable information.  
The site includes full text of a new book
on how to help pro se litigants: Richard
Zorza, The Self-Help Friendly Court:
Designed from the Ground Up to Work for
People without Lawyers (2002).  The book
addresses differences in handling truly
uncontested cases from those with issues
actually in dispute, how to handle cases in
which only one side has an attorney, and
the need for pro se access to the courts to
achieve full public trust and confidence in
the judiciary. 
The website is being prepared by sev-
eral organizations supported by a grant
from the SJI.  Participating organizations
are the National Center for State Courts,
the American Judicature Society, Legal
Services Corp., Pro Bono Net, SJI, and
Zorza Associates.
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